トップPDF PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...
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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices (price ratio) and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, a and b, have the following indirect utility ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 政府（官僚組織、政治家）はどのように行動するのか？ 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 私企業の中でなにが起こっているのか？ 組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） 組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ...
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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Overlapping Generations Model (2) Proof. Suppose that each member of generation t + 1 transfers one unit of its endowment to generation t. Now generation 1 is better off since it receives 3 unit of ...
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Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Pareto Efficiency (1) A situation is called Pareto efficient if there is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. That is, there is no way to make all agents better off. To put it ...
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Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Second Welfare Theorem (1) Theorem 12 Consider an exchange economy with P i∈I e i ≫ 0, and assume that utility function u i is continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave for all i ∈ I. Then, any ...
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Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Second Welfare Theorem Theorem 9 Suppose the conditions stated in the existence theorem are satisfied. Let (x ∗ , y ∗ ) be a feasible Pareto efficient allocation. Then, there are income transfers, T 1 , ..., T I ...
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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (! x ; ! y ) = (1; 1) (a) Assume there are only two individuals in this economy. Then, draw the Edgworth-box and show the contract curve. Find a general equilibrium (equilibrium price and allocation) if it ...
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