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トップPDF Lec13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lec13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Arrow’s Requirements of the SWF (1) Unrestricted Domain (UD) The domain of f must include all possible combinations of individual preference relations on X. Weak Pareto Principle (WP) For any pair of alternatives ...

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Lec13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Thm An aggregate production plan y maximizes aggregate profit, if and only if each firm’s production plan y j maximizes its individual profit for all j ∈ J. The theorem implies that there are two equivalent ways ...

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Lec13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  The threat of rejection results in larger offers compared to the dictator game, and recipients enjoy significantly higher payoffs on average.  Most of the proposer divide the pr[r] ...

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Final13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 4. Incomplete Information (16 points, think carefully) There are four different bills, $1, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill  ...

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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.  Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 安田予想で未受賞候補者たち Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ! Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうか? Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう… ...

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...

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Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis   ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2 units of the firm 1’s good and A − p 2 + p 1 2 units of the firm 2’s good. Assume that the firms have identical (and constant) marginal costs c(< A), and the payoff for each firm is equal to the ...

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...

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