Top PDF PQ4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
PQ4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]
Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r]
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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
安田予想で未受賞の候補者たち
Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ！
Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうのか？
Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織の経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう…
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]
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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]
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4th JapanTaiwan_1201 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
December 4, 2010, “Soukairou Hall ( 想海樓ホール )” 1 st floor ,
GRIPS, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo
Organized by GRIPS, Hitotsubashi University Global COE program “Innovation in the Japanese Corporation-Education and Research Center for Empirical Management Studies” and Osaka University and Kyoto University Global COE program “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics”
Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method
You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form
PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Q = K 1 =4
L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions.
(a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’s short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’s
Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
(1) Write the payoff functions π 1 and π 2 (as a function of p 1 and p 2 ).
(2) Derive the best response function for each player. (3) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
(4) Derive the prices (p 1 , p 2 ) that maximize joint-profit, i.e., π 1 + π 2 .
en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]
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Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Two neighboring homeowners, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose how many hours to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn (denoted by l 1 and l 2 ). Since the appearance of one’s property depends in part on the beauty of the surrounding neighborhood, homeowner’s benefit is increasing in the hours that neighbor spends on his own lawn. Suppose that 1’s payoff is expressed by
Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]
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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.
Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .
After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L
(step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.
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Lec1 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
R n + := {(x 1 , ..., x n )|x i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} ⊂ R n .
For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y. Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives.
A budget set is a set of feasible consumption bundles, represented as B(p, ω) = {x ∈ X|px ≤ ω}, where p is an n-dimensional positive vector interpreted as prices, and ω is a positive number interpreted as the consumer’s wealth.
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Midterm14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r]
PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
(a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set.
(b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open.
(c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. (You can use (b) and De Morgan’s Law without proofs.)
PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4
Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014)
1. Question 1 (7 points)
A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.