# トップPDF Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**i: X is a set of possible agreements: a set of possible consequences that the two players can jointly achieve. D ∈ X is the disagreement outcome: the ...

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### Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**units (i 6= j, i = 1,

**2**) of the good that firm i produces. Assume that each firm’

**s**marginal cost is 6, and the payoff ...

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### Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**(as a function of p 1 and p

**2**). (b) Derive the best response functions and solve the pure-strategy Nash equilib- rium of this game. (c) Derive the prices (p 1 , p ...

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### Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**, simul- taneously and independently select ...

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### Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...

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### Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...

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### PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**( )) is ...

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### Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**strategy specifies optimal actions given her beliefs and the strategies of the other players, and The beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule wherever possible. If (4) is not required, the ...

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### Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**; 3, are considering to open new shops near the Roppongi cross (Each company opens at most one shop). They make the decision ...

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### Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**): Existence of Pivotal Voter Lemma 3 (Existence of Pivotal Voter) There is a voter n ∗ = n(b) who is extremely pivotal in the sense that by changing his vote at some profile he can move b from the ...

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### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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### EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**takes a linear strategy, b

**2**= v

**2**. Then, derive the probability such that buyer 1 wins as ...

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### Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**15**points) Three …rms (1,

**2**and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= ...

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### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**must be indi¤erent amongst choosing X and Y , which implies 4q + 6(1 q) = 7(1 q) , 5q = 1 , q = ...player

**2**takes X with probability 3=4 (and Y with probability ...

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### EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ...

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### PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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