トップPDF Game14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Game14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Game14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

How do people actually play this game? In one experiment involving $10 prizes and 32 pairs of subjects, only two trustors invested nothing; ive of them invested every­ thing. Overall, trustors invested about half their initial unds. Trustees varied widely in their choices. Twenty percent retuned nothing and another 27 percent returned only $1. But others paid back large amounts. Among the 30 trustees who invested something, II received more than their investments, 16 received less, and 3 received the same amount. Overall, trustors received about $0.95 in return for every dollar invested.38 These results are fairly typical of experimental trust games. Trustors show trust by investing sizable 37Michael Farrand (cd.). Records of the Federal Convention, Vois. I-III, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 578-579. lIJoyce Berg. John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, "Trust, Reciprocity. and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior 10, July 1995, pp. 122-142.
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syllabus game14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus game14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  1. Course Description    This  is  an  introductory  course  in  game  theory,  which  will  provide  you  with  mathematical  tools  for  analyzing  strategic  situations  ‐  your  optimal  decision  depends  on what other people will do. In particular, we will study central solution concepts in  game  theory  such  as  Nash  equilibrium,  subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  and  Bayesian  equilibrium. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important analytical tool  in such fields as economics, management, political science, phycology and biology. To  illustrate  its  analytical  value,  we  will  cover  a  variety  of  applications  that  include  international relations, development, business competition, auctions, marriage market,  and  so  forth.  There  is  no  prerequisite  for  this  course,  although  some  background  on  microeconomics and familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful. 
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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.   Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた!?   Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたは好材料?   Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い?   清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’s short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’s

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the winner pays the average of the two bids b + b

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).   Ber[r]

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Strategy and Outcome     Strategy in dynamic game = Complete plan of actions   What each player will do in every possible chance of move.   Even if some actions will not be taken in the actual play, players specify all contingent action plan.

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Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Two neighboring homeowners, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose how many hours to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn (denoted by l 1 and l 2 ). Since the appearance of one’s property depends in part on the beauty of the surrounding neighborhood, homeowner’s benefit is increasing in the hours that neighbor spends on his own lawn. Suppose that 1’s payoff is expressed by

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

1. Rationality    Players can reach Nash equilibrium only by rational reasoning in some games, e.g., Prisoners’ dilemma.    However, rationality alone is often insufficient to lead to NE. (see Battle of the sexes, Chicken game, etc.)    A correct belief about players’ future strategies

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)    (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!   Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis     ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!    Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash equilibrium. (c) If there are two Nash equilibria in pure-strategy, they can ALWAYS be Pareto

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