[PDF] Top 20 Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... That is, given that the incumbent’s information set is reached, choosing A is clearly optimal irrespective of her belief over nodes. → Choosing F looks non-credible. SPNE cannot eliminate this since there is no ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) Zermelo’s theorem assures that the first mover has a winning strategy in ANY perfect information game with strictly opposite interests. (e) The weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... ローチ ローチ ローチ にある。単なる現状分析や、選択制を導 入あるいは廃止すべきか、という是非論にとど まらず、 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 から、望 ましい学校選択制の制度設計について、 ゲーム ゲーム ゲーム ゲーム ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) Let p be a probability that player 2 would choose Rock, and q be a probability that she chooses Paper. Note that her probability of choosing Scissors is written as 1 p q. Under mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... student s prefers an empty slot at school c to her own assignment, and (nw2) and (nw3) mean that legal constraints are not violated when s is assigned the empty slot without changing other students’ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... or u i ( i ; i ) u i (s i ; i ) for all s i 2 S i . (2) 7. Mixed strategies: Application A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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すべてのプレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある
「支配される戦略の逐次消去」（後述）
（お互いの行動に関する）「正しい予想の共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1, 2, where α i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Then, for i = 1, 2, f i (U ′ , d ′ ) = α i f i (U, d) + β i ...d 2 and (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ U if and only if (v 2 , v 1 ) ∈ U , ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Derive firm 1’s payoff function and the best reply function. (b) Solve the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. How much profit does each firm earn? (c) Now suppose that firms decide prices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies in which each player i accepts an exchange if and only if the value v i does not exceed some threshold θ i (b) How would your answer to (a) change if ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Edgeworth Box | エッジワース・ボックス The most useful example of an exchange economy is one in which there are two people and two goods. This economy’s set of allocations can be illustrated in an Edgeworth box ( ... 完全なドキュメントを参照