[PDF] Top 20 Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices (price ratio) and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, a and b, have the following indirect utility ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) If a consumer’s preference satisfies completeness and transitivity, her prefer- ence can be ALWAYS represented by some utility function. (b) It is POSSIBLE that an expenditure function is a convex function of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1. True or False (10 points, moderate) Answer whether each of the following statements is true or false. You DON’T need to explain the reason. (a) Suppose a preference relation % on X is rational. Then, if a set X ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... for i = 1, · · · , n. We now have to show that p ∗ is a competitive equilibrium. Using Warlas’ law, we can show that z i (p ∗ ) = 0 for all i. It is common to show the existence of equilibrium by applying a ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Second Welfare Theorem Theorem 9 Suppose the conditions stated in the existence theorem are satisfied. Let (x ∗ , y ∗ ) be a feasible Pareto efficient allocation. Then, there are income transfers, T 1 , ..., T I ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... An Arrow-Debreu security is a contract that agrees to pay one unit of a numeraire (a currency or a commodity) if a particular state of nature occurs and pays zero in all the other states. Suppose there exist no market ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Hint: You can graphically show the claims if you prefer to do so. (b) Derive the critical points (i.e., the combinations satisfying the …rst order con- ditions) of this maximization problem by using Lagrange’s ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ... 完全なドキュメントを参照