トップPDF Final08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Final08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (b) Consider the two-period repeated game in which this stage game is played twice. Suppose the repeated game payo¤s are simply the sum of the payo¤s in each of the two periods. Then, is there a subgame ...
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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... You and your n − 1 roommates (n ≧ 2) each have five hours of free time that could be used to clean your apartment. You all dislike cleaning, but you all like having a clean apartment: each person i’s payoff is the ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
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Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...
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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...
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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...
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Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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Midterm14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r] ...
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Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference ...
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Slide2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prove that if a firm exhibits increasing returns to scale then average cost must strictly decrease with output. 4.[r] ...
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