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トップPDF PS1 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a ...

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices (price ratio) and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, a and b, have the following indirect utility ...

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ...

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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the ...

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ...

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) If a consumer’s preference satisfies completeness and transitivity, her prefer- ence can be ALWAYS represented by some utility function. (b) It is POSSIBLE that an expenditure function is a convex function of ...

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Final1 08 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 1. True or False (10 points, moderate) Answer whether each of the following statements is true or false. You DON’T need to explain the reason. (a) Suppose a preference relation % on X is rational. Then, if a set X ...

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Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... for i = 1, · · · , n. We now have to show that p ∗ is a competitive equilibrium. Using Warlas’ law, we can show that z i (p ∗ ) = 0 for all i. It is common to show the existence of equilibrium by applying a ...

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Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Second Welfare Theorem Theorem 9 Suppose the conditions stated in the existence theorem are satisfied. Let (x ∗ , y ∗ ) be a feasible Pareto efficient allocation. Then, there are income transfers, T 1 , ..., T I ...

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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... An Arrow-Debreu security is a contract that agrees to pay one unit of a numeraire (a currency or a commodity) if a particular state of nature occurs and pays zero in all the other states. Suppose there exist no market ...

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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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Final1 09 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her ...

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Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Hint: You can graphically show the claims if you prefer to do so. (b) Derive the critical points (i.e., the combinations satisfying the …rst order con- ditions) of this maximization problem by using Lagrange’s ...

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Final1 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination ...

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Final1 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ...

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