# トップPDF PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**(receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player

**2**where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’

**s**own share. Player

**2**can decide whether accept the offer or reject ...player ...

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### Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ...

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### Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**dilemma. You can focus on the trigger strategy, i.e., players choose a stage game Nash equilibrium (D; D) as a punishment whenever someone has once deviated ...

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### Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**preference relation on X (an binary relation satisfying completeness and transitivity. → Let P i (or ≻i) and I i (or ∼i) be the associated relations of strict individual preference ...

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### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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### Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**bid, b 0 is the loser’

**s**bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ...

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### Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**payo¤ function. (b) Derive each partner’

**s**best reply function and graphically draw them in a …gure. (Taking m in the horizontal axis and n in the vertical axis.) (c) Is this game ...

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### Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ...

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### Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**, where v i ...

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### Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**belief puts probability one on the single decision node. (

**2**) Given their beliefs, the players’ strategies must be sequentially rational. That ...

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### Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**utility. If there is no trade, then there is no change in utility. It would make no difference to define, say, the seller’

**s**utility to ...

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### Lec2 7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**. A leader never becomes worse off since she could have achieved Cournot profit level in the Stackelberg game simply by choosing the Cournot output: a gain from commitment. A follower does become worse off ...

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### Lec2 9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**) is true or false independent of x. Thm If u is a vNM continuous utility function ...

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### Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**の**変化をどうはかるか？ When the economic environment or market outcome changes, a consumer may be made better off ( 改善 ) or worse off ( 悪化 ). Economists often want to measure how consumers ...

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### PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Due on May 14 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (6 points) (a) Suppose the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, show that the associated indirect ...

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### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**) Boundary and interior ◮ A point x is called a boundary point of a set S in R n if every ε-ball centered at x contains points in S as well as points not in S. The set of all boundary ...

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