[PDF] Top 20 Lec1 9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A vector z in this space is interpreted as a production combination; positive components in z are interpreted as outputs and negative components as inputs. (Note that the firm’s profit can be expressed as pz = Pk ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... A function f (x) is homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g is a strictly increasing function and h is a function which is homogeneous of degree 1. Suppose preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Reconsidered” American Economics Review, Vol.101: 399-410.  Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (forthcoming), “Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.  Gale and Shapley (1962), ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...
【戦略】 個々のプレイヤーがとることのできる行動
【利得】 起こり得る行動の組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲームの解（予測）はどうやって与えられる？ A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロアの恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Revealed Preference (10 points) Consider the following choice problem. There are 4 feasible elements, and we denote the set of all elements as X = fa; b; c; dg. Suppose individual choice behaviors are described by two ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) If a consumer’s preference satisfies completeness and transitivity, her prefer- ence can be ALWAYS represented by some utility function. (b) It is POSSIBLE that an expenditure function is a convex function of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照