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トップPDF Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

トップPDF Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website によって編集されました 123deta JP

Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (b) Revenue equivalence theorem claims that the equilibrium bidding strategy under the …rst-price auction is ALWAYS identical to the one under the second- price auction. (c) EVERY perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a weak ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

2

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? 4. Mixed Strategy (15 points) Three …rms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Arrow’s Requirements of the SWF (1) Unrestricted Domain (UD) The domain of f must include all possible combinations of individual preference relations on X. Weak Pareto Principle (WP) For any pair of alternatives ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 5. Bayesian Game (20 points) There are 10 envelopes and each of them contains a number 1 through 10. That is, one envelope contains 1, another envelope contains 2, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Hint: Your answers in (a) – (c) may change depending on the value of θ. 4. Duopoly (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2, simul- taneously and independently select ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Rm Each of these utility functions measures the change in the player’s utility. If there is no trade, then there is no change in utility. It would make no difference to define, say, the seller’s utility to ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 1 2 . A leader never becomes worse off since she could have achieved Cournot profit level in the Stackelberg game simply by choosing the Cournot output: a gain from commitment. A follower does become worse off ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Rm Since every subgame of an infinitely repeated game is identical to the game as a whole, we have to consider only two types of subgames: (i) subgame in which all the outcomes of earlier stages have been (C1, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... First-Price: General Model (1) Consider a first-price auction with n bidders in which all the conditions in the previous theorem are satisfied. Assume that bidders play a symmetric equilibrium, β(x). Given some bidding ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 1 Nature draws a type t i for the Sender from a set of feasible types T = {t1 , ..., t I} according to a probability distribution p(ti), where p(ti) > 0 for every i and p(t 1 ) + · · · + p(tn) = 1. 2 Sender ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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EX2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PQ2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 2: Due on May 14 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (6 points) (a) Suppose the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, show that the associated indirect ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Open Set and Closed Set (2) Boundary and interior ◮ A point x is called a boundary point of a set S in R n if every ε-ball centered at x contains points in S as well as points not in S. The set of all boundary ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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EX2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

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