トップPDF Lec2 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec2 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... let s −i denote a strategy profile other than player i’s strategy, (s 1 , ......, s i−1 , s i+1 , ..., s n ......, s n ) is the payoff to player i if the players choose ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... c s) − |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c) \ {ˆ s}| o holds for any step l in the cycle, at any school c which ˆ s is admitted, q τ(ˆ c s) = |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c)| holds for any step l in the ...ˆ ...
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Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A; X) and (B; Y ). (d) Let p be a probability that player 2 chooses X and q be a probability that player 1 chooses A. Since player 1 must be indi¤erent amongst ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... るい ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ あい あい あい あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき こうき ...
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EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...
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PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each player’s payo¤ ...
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PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...
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EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the players ...
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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...
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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Confirm that by choosing the tax t appropriately, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced. (d) Add a second firm with a different production function. Now the consumers observe a pollution level b = b 1 ...
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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... すべてのプレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある 「支配される戦略の逐次消去」（後述） （お互いの行動に関する）「正しい予想の共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ...
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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ...
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Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...
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Lec1 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... R n + := {(x 1 , ..., x n )|x i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} ⊂ R n . For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y. Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives. A budget set is a set of feasible ...
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PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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