トップPDF Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... タカ ―ハト・ゲーム（チキンゲーム） 交渉事に強気（タカ戦略）でのぞむか弱気（ハト戦略）でのぞ むかをそれぞれのプレーヤーが決定 ナッシュ均衡は非対称な行動の組：（ ハト 、 タカ ）と（ タカ 、 ハト ） 現実に、ハト戦略とタカ戦略のどちらも観察されることに対応 ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Open Set and Closed Set (2) Boundary and interior ◮ A point x is called a boundary point of a set S in R n if every ε-ball centered at x contains points in S as well as points not in S. The set of all boundary ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ◮ with probability p, a consumer with wealth x will receive a times of her current wealth x ◮ with probability 1 − p she will receive b times of x. Thm Assume that the assumptions of Pratt’s Theorem holds. Then, ...
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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3. Nash Equilibrium (16 points) Monica and Nancy have formed a business partnership. Each partner must make her e¤ort decision without knowing what e¤ort decision the other player has made. Let m be the amount of e¤ort ...
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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 5. Bayesian Game (20 points) There are 10 envelopes and each of them contains a number 1 through 10. That is, one envelope contains 1, another envelope contains 2, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ...
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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (b) Revenue equivalence theorem claims that the equilibrium bidding strategy under the …rst-price auction is ALWAYS identical to the one under the second- price auction. (c) EVERY perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a weak ...
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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Write the payoff functions π 1 and π 2 (as a function of p 1 and p 2 ). (b) Derive the best response functions and solve the pure-strategy Nash equilib- rium of this game. (c) Derive the prices (p 1 , p ...
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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Hint: Your answers in (a) – (c) may change depending on the value of θ. 4. Duopoly (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2, simul- taneously and independently select ...
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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ...
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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ...
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Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... For a singleton information set, i.e., x = h(x), the player’s belief puts probability one on the single decision node. (2) Given their beliefs, the players’ strategies must be sequentially rational. That ...
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Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A belief about other players’ types is a conditional probability distribution of other players’ types given the player’s knowledge of her own type p i (t −i |t i ). When nature reveals t i to player i, she can ...
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Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... First-Price: General Model (1) Consider a first-price auction with n bidders in which all the conditions in the previous theorem are satisfied. Assume that bidders play a symmetric equilibrium, β(x). Given some bidding ...
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Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Proof Sketch (2): Existence of Pivotal Voter Lemma 3 (Existence of Pivotal Voter) There is a voter n ∗ = n(b) who is extremely pivotal in the sense that by changing his vote at some profile he can move b from the ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A bargaining situation is described by a tuple hX, D, % 1 , % 2 i: X is a set of possible agreements: a set of possible consequences that the two players can jointly achieve. D ∈ X is the disagreement outcome: the ...
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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...
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Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Connection between UMP and EMP | UMP と EMP の関係 There is a strong link between the utility maximization problem (UMP, 効用最 大化問題 ) and the expenditure minimization problem (EMP, 支出最小化問題 ). Let us first consider the ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ローチ ローチ ローチ にある。単なる現状分析や、選択制を導 入あるいは廃止すべきか、という是非論にとど まらず、 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 制度をデザインするという視点 から、望 ましい学校選択制の制度設計について、 ゲーム ゲーム ゲーム ゲーム ...
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