[PDF] Top 20 Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 動学ゲーム分析で気を付けること
時間を通じた動学ゲームにはナッシュ均衡が複数存在 する場合が多い⇒これ自体は問題ではないが…
一部の均衡が信憑性のない「から脅し」 「から脅し」 「から脅し」に依存している 「から脅し」 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... let s −i denote a strategy profile other than player i’s strategy, (s 1 , ......, s i−1 , s i+1 , ..., s n ......, s n ) is the payoff to player i if the players choose ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... ◮ For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y. ◮ Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives. ◮ A budget set is a set of feasible consumption bundles, represented as B(p, ω) = {x ∈ X|px ≤ ω}, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Michael Jensen (1939-, 企業金融) → 金融は無い？ Jerry Hausman (1946?-, 計量) → もはやチャンス無し？ Oliver Hart (1948-, 組織の経済学、契約理論) → しばらく難しい？ Bengt Holmstrom (1949-, 契約理論) → しばらく難しい？ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.  Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
 (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... December 4, 2010, “Soukairou Hall ( 想海樓ホール )” 1 st floor , GRIPS, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo  Organized by GRIPS, Hitotsubashi University Global COE program “Innovation in the Japanese ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... of 4 and a “strong” firm is given an endowment of 5, and any integral amount of the endowment could be invested in a ...or 4) and the strong firm has six (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis
 ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照