Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r]

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動学ゲーム分析で気を付けること
時間を通じた動学ゲームにはナッシュ均衡が複数存在
する場合が多い⇒これ自体は問題ではないが… 一部**の**均衡が信憑性**の**ない「から脅し」 「から脅し」 「から脅し」に依存している 「から脅し」

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of strategies, and let **s** −i denote a strategy profile other than
player i’**s** strategy, (**s** 1 , ..., **s** i−1 , **s** i+1 , ..., **s** n ).
◮ Let u i : S 1 × · · · × S n → R denote player i’**s** payoff function:
u i (**s** 1 , ..., **s** n ) is the payoff to player i if the players choose the

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Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r]

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◮ For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y.
◮ Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives.
◮ A budget set is a set of feasible consumption bundles,
represented as B(p, ω) = {x ∈ X|px ≤ ω}, where p is an n-dimensional positive vector interpreted as prices, and ω is a positive number interpreted as the consumer’**s** wealth.

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A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

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A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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Michael Jensen (1939-, 企業金融) → 金融は無い？
Jerry Hausman (1946?-, 計量) → もはやチャンス無し？
Oliver Hart (1948-, 組織**の**経済学、契約理論) → しばらく難しい？ Bengt Holmstrom (1949-, 契約理論) → しばらく難しい？

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If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

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Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
(Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice!
Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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December **4**, 2010, “Soukairou Hall ( 想海樓ホール )” 1 st floor ,
GRIPS, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo
Organized by GRIPS, Hitotsubashi University Global COE program “Innovation in the Japanese Corporation-Education and Research Center for Empirical Management Studies” and Osaka University and Kyoto University Global COE program “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics”

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Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’**s** law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’**s** Method
You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form

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payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’**s** strategy.
Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .
After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L
(step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

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5. Mixed Strategy (20 points)
Consider a patent race game in which a “weak” firm is given an endowment of **4** and a “strong” firm is given an endowment of 5, and any integral amount of the endowment could be invested in a project. That is, the weak firm has five pure strategies (invest 0, 1, 2, 3 or **4**) and the strong firm has six (0, 1, 2, 3, **4** or 5). The winner of the patent race receives the return of 10. Both players are instructed that whichever player invests the most will win the race and if there is a tie, both lose: neither gets the return of 10.

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Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis
( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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