トップPDF Game11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Game11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A game-theory model illustrates how reputation is ...ing game-theoretic example is completely abstract-it is not a model of a irm per se-but it clearly demonstrates how reputation is ...repeated game ...
5
syllabus game11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... in game theory, which will provide you with mathematical tools for analyzing strategically interdependent situations, ...in game theory such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and Bayesian ...
2
MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...
49
Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
23
Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
17
Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
20
Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？ Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたのは好材料？ Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？ 清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い ...
21
Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
18
PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
2
PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . ...
3
Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) ...the game is played infinitely many times: payoff of each player is discounted sum of each period payoff with some discount factor δ ∈ (0, ...
2
Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Strategy and Outcome Strategy in dynamic game = Complete plan of actions What each player will do in every possible chance of move. Even if some actions will not be taken in the actual play, players ...
16
Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...
20
Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...
16
en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...
84
Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
27
Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
27
Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
17
Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
20
Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...
3
