A **game**-theory model illustrates how reputation is traded.5 The follow ing **game**-theoretic example is completely abstract-it is not a model of a irm per se-but it clearly demonstrates how reputation is traded. Consider the two period repeated **game** analyzed at the beginning of Chapter 22; the stage **game** is reproduced in Figure 23.1. Here I add a new twist. Suppose there are three players, called player 1, player 21, and player 22. In the irst period, players 1 and 21 play the stage **game** (with player 21 playing the role of player 2 in the stage **game**). Then player 2' retires, so he cannot play the stage **game** with player 1 again in period 2. However, player 2' holds the right to play in pe riod 2, even though he cannot exercise this right himself. Player 2' can sell this right to player 22, in which case players 1 and 22 play the stage **game** in the second period.

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This is an introductory course in **game** theory, which will provide you with mathematical tools for analyzing strategically interdependent situations, i.e., the situations in which your optimal decision depends on what other people will do. In particular, we will study central solution concepts in **game** theory such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and Bayesian equilibrium. To illustrate the analytical value of these tools, we will cover a variety of applications, e.g., international relations, business competition, auctions, marriage market, and so forth. There is no prerequisite for this course, although some background on microeconomics and familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful.

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Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

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A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？
Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めた**の**は好材料？ Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？
清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い

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elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’**s** law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’**s** Method
You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form

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Q = K 1 =4
L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions.
(a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’**s** short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’**s**

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(5) Suppose that this **game** is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated **game**. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period payoff.
(6) Now suppose that the **game** is played infinitely many times: payoff of each player is discounted sum of each period payoff with some discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Assume specifically that A = 16, c = 8. Then, derive the condition under which the trigger strategy sustains the joint-profit maximizing prices you derived in (3) (as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium).

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Strategy and Outcome
Strategy in dynamic **game** = Complete plan of actions What each player will do in every possible chance of move.
Even if some actions will not be taken in the actual play, players specify all contingent action plan.

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payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’**s** strategy.
Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .
After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L
(step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

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Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r]

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Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

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Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
(Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice!
Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis
( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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(a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive.
(b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’**s** dominant strategy MUST be a Nash equilibrium. (c) If there are two Nash equilibria in pure-strategy, they can ALWAYS be Pareto

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