• 検索結果がありません。

トップPDF PS6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

PS6 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 6: Due on July 30 Advanced Microeconomics II (Spring, 2nd, 2012) 1. Question 1 (7 points) Suppose a government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neutral mobile phone companies, i = 1, ...

3

Lec6 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...

16

Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

20

Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ...

16

Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

18

Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...

16

Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

23

Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

17

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた!? Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたは好材料? Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い? 清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い ...

21

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.  Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...

49

Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each ...

2

Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

20

Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

17

Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis   ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 6. Cost Minimization Problem A …m can rent capital (K) at a rental price r and hire labor (L) at a wage w. To produce anything at all requires one unit of capital, i.e. r 1 = r is a …xed cost; this is sunk in the ...

3

Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

20

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...

3

PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...

2

Final14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore  ...

3

Show all 10000 documents...