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トップPDF PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  政府(官僚組織、政治家)はどのように行動するか?  政治経済学 政治経済学 政治経済学 政治経済学  私企業中でなにが起こっているか?  組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス) 組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス) ...

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ...

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (c) Formulate the cost minimization problem (you may denote a target output level by y). Then, solve it and derive the (minimum) cost function, c(w 1 , w 2 , y). 5. Risk Aversion (15 points) Suppose that a ...

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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ...

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the ...

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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ...

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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Suppose that consumer i has preferences over the contingent consumption plans that satisfy expected utility hypothesis: U i (x i 1 , x i 2 ) = π 1 u i (x i 1 ) + π 2 u i (x i 2 ) where π 1 (π ...

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Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Pareto Efficiency (1) A situation is called Pareto efficient if there is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. That is, there is no way to make all agents better off. To put it ...

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Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Second Welfare Theorem (1) Theorem 12 Consider an exchange economy with P i∈I e i ≫ 0, and assume that utility function u i is continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave for all i ∈ I. Then, any ...

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Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Second Welfare Theorem Theorem 9 Suppose the conditions stated in the existence theorem are satisfied. Let (x ∗ , y ∗ ) be a feasible Pareto efficient allocation. Then, there are income transfers, T 1 , ..., T I ...

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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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Final1 08 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (! x ; ! y ) = (1; 1) (a) Assume there are only two individuals in this economy. Then, draw the Edgworth-box and show the contract curve. Find a general equilibrium (equilibrium price and allocation) if it ...

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Final1 09 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her ...

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Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Hint: You can graphically show the claims if you prefer to do so. (b) Derive the critical points (i.e., the combinations satisfying the …rst order con- ditions) of this maximization problem by using Lagrange’s ...

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