トップPDF 2015MK 最近の更新履歴 TKawashima's Homepage

2015MK 最近の更新履歴  TKawashima's Homepage

2015MK 最近の更新履歴 TKawashima's Homepage

 「数学活用」という科目は,これまで学習した高校数 学 ( 数学 I ・ A ・ II) とは異なる授業科目です.  ここでは,次ようなことが内容です. 1. 数学を「活用」することによって社会や自然科学に

1 さらに読み込む

kadai 最近の更新履歴  TKawashima's Homepage

kadai 最近の更新履歴 TKawashima's Homepage

4 結びにかえて  記述統計内容が扱われる「データ分析」は, 実生活や実社会に密接に結びついている内容であ る.それ故,いかに具体的な事例・素材をもとに 授業できるかが重要であり,そのためには教科書 記述以外に教員が有用と思う教材を準備する必 要がある.そしてそのことが生徒に必要性を実感 させられることに直結するであろうと筆者は考え ている.

4 さらに読み込む

keiryou 最近の更新履歴  TKawashima's Homepage

keiryou 最近の更新履歴 TKawashima's Homepage

 このような状況を考えたとき,冒頭に述べたよ うな現行高等学校統計カリキュラム,すなわち 記述統計は必履修だが推測統計が選択科目 (項目) である現状は極めて貧弱であると筆者は考える. 統計的方法を利活用したり,その有用性を実感で きるようにするためには推測統計基礎は必須で ある.また,この他にも統計を研究ないし実務に 応用する際,記述統計だけで充分であることは稀 であり,推測統計必要性は高い.そして高校数 学統計学習においても,その有用性を実感でき るような教材を配することが重要であると考える.  高校数学における統計位置づけは,これまで 様々に変わってきた.昭和 53 年告示学習指導
さらに見せる

4 さらに読み込む

Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.   Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .   After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

20 さらに読み込む

Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

17 さらに読み込む

Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).   Ber[r]

16 さらに読み込む

Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

18 さらに読み込む

Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)    (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!   Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

27 さらに読み込む

Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis     ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!    Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

27 さらに読み込む

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

You and your n − 1 roommates (n ≧ 2) each have five hours of free time that could be used to clean your apartment. You all dislike cleaning, but you all like having a clean apartment: each person i’s payoff is the total hours spent (by everyone) cleaning, minus a number c (> 0) times the hours spent individually cleaning. That is,

3 さらに読み込む

Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

20 さらに読み込む

Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

23 さらに読み込む

PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r]

2 さらに読み込む

Final14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

    5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points)  There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one  bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore 1/3.  Each  individual  knows  only  her  own  bill,  and  is  simultaneously  given  the  option  of  exchanging her bill for the other individual’s bill. The bills will be exchanged if and only  if  both  individuals  wish  to  do  so;  otherwise  no  exchange  occurs.  That  is,  each  individuals can choose either exchange (E) or not (N), and exchange occurs only when  both  choose  E.  We  assume  that  individuals’  objective  is  to  maximize  their  expected  monetary payoff ($). 
さらに見せる

3 さらに読み込む

Midterm14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists.  iii.[r]

2 さらに読み込む

Final1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference can be expressed in the form of U (x, y, z) = V (x, y) + z. Derive V (x, y).

2 さらに読み込む

Slide2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Slide2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

16 さらに読み込む

Slide1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r]

20 さらに読み込む

PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prove that if a firm exhibits increasing returns to scale then average cost must strictly decrease with output. 4.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. (You can use (b) and De Morgan’s Law without proofs.)

1 さらに読み込む

Show all 10000 documents...

関連した話題