トップPDF Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ◮ A lottery p is a function that assigns a nonnegative number to each prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ここで Apple ’sの行動は Apple が Google の行動をどう予想 するかによって決まる Google の最適な戦略は Google が「 Apple が Google の行動をどう予想するか」をどう予想するかによって 決まる ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A consumer has a utility function u(x, y, z) = min{x, y}+z. The prices of the three goods are given by (p x , p y , p z ) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Note that the utility function u can be ...
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最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 政府（官僚組織、政治家）はどのように行動するのか？ 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 私企業の中でなにが起こっているのか？ 組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） 組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） ...
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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ...
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Final1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination ...
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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Suppose that consumer i has preferences over the contingent consumption plans that satisfy expected utility hypothesis: U i (x i 1 , x i 2 ) = π 1 u i (x i 1 ) + π 2 u i (x i 2 ) where π 1 (π ...
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Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Pareto Efficiency (1) A situation is called Pareto efficient if there is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. That is, there is no way to make all agents better off. To put it ...
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Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Second Welfare Theorem (1) Theorem 12 Consider an exchange economy with P i∈I e i ≫ 0, and assume that utility function u i is continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave for all i ∈ I. Then, any ...
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Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Second Welfare Theorem Theorem 9 Suppose the conditions stated in the existence theorem are satisfied. Let (x ∗ , y ∗ ) be a feasible Pareto efficient allocation. Then, there are income transfers, T 1 , ..., T I ...
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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (! x ; ! y ) = (1; 1) (a) Assume there are only two individuals in this economy. Then, draw the Edgworth-box and show the contract curve. Find a general equilibrium (equilibrium price and allocation) if it ...
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Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her ...
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