トップPDF 学校選択制度AA m2pdf 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

学校選択制度AA m2pdf 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

学校選択制度AA m2pdf 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

– DA2 : マイノリティうち優先順位高い生徒は、学校 優先順位を超えて入学可能 – DA3 :マイノリティが入学希望した場合、マイノリティだけが 入学できる定員枠を別途設ける。それ以外定員枠はど ちら生徒も入学可能

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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(e) The social welfare function introduced by Arrow is to derive social UTILITY by adding up individual utilities. 2. Externalities (25 points) Consider a one-consumer, one-firm economy (or equiv- alently an economy with many identical consumers and firms.) There are two private commodities. The firm also produces a level of pollution b. The produc- tion set of the firm is the convex set γ = {(y 1 , y 2 , b | G(y 1 , y 2 , b ) ≤ 0)}, where G

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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(d) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. (e) In the simple moral hazard problem we studied in class, the optimal wage (= s( )) is NOT necessarily increasing in outcome (= x).

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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1,

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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

are differentiated. After the prices are set, consumers demand 24 − p i + p j 2 units (i 6= j, i = 1, 2) of the good that firm i produces. Assume that each firm’s marginal cost is 6, and the payoff for each firm is equal to the firm’s profit.

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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) If a player randomizes pure strategies X and Y in a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, she MUST be indi¤erent between choosing X and Y . 2. Monopoly (10 points) Suppose a monopoly …rm operates in two di¤erent markets, A and B. Inverse demand for each market is given as follows.

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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the same time, their profits become 0. If exactly one firm advertises in the morning, its profit is 1; if exactly one firm advertises in the evening, its profit is 2. Firms must make their daily advertising decisions simultaneously.

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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible strategic model that has an equilibrium corresponding to the Nash solution, the appeal of Nash’s axioms is in doubt.

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Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

R i (or % i ) An individual i’s preference relation on X (an binary relation satisfying completeness and transitivity. → Let P i (or ≻i) and I i (or ∼i) be the associated relations of strict individual preference and indifference, respectively.

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Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

β(x i ) = c + θx i . (1) Now suppose that player 2 follows the above equilibrium strategy, and we shall check whether player 1 has an incentive to choose the same linear strategy (1). Player 1’s optimization problem, given she received a valuation x 1 , is

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Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

1 Nature draws a type t i for the Sender from a set of feasible types T = {t1 , ..., t I} according to a probability distribution p(ti), where p(ti) > 0 for every i and p(t 1 ) + · · · + p(tn) = 1. 2 Sender observes ti and then chooses a message mj from a set

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices third-degree price discrimination. Group A’s elasticity of demand is ǫ A and

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PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block for each company is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

object for each buyer is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. (a) Suppose that buyer 2 takes a linear strategy, b 2 = v 2 . Then, derive the probability such that buyer 1 wins as a function of b 1 . (b) Solve a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

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Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is called common values case. The outcome (of the mechanism) is described by

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PS2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

4. Question 4 (5 points) Consider a game of election with asymmetric information among voters. Whether candidate A or candidate B is elected depends on the votes of two citizens (denoted by 1 and 2). The economy may be in one of two states, α and β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α and candidate B is best if the state is β. The payoff for each citizen is symmetric and given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other candidate wins, and 1/2 if the candidates tie. Suppose that citizen 1 is informed of the true state, whereas citizen 2 believes it is α with probability 0.9 and β with probability 0.1. Each citizen may either vote for candidate A, vote for candidate B, or not vote.
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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

 (一般に)ナッシュ均衡は複数存在する場合がある  プレイヤー全員にとってあるナッシュ均衡よりも別ナッシュ 均衡方が望ましい場合もある  良い均衡(Mac, Mac)ではなく悪い均衡( Win , Win )が選 ばれてしまう危険性がある

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Micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

How to Measure Welfare Change | 厚生変化をどうはかるか? When the economic environment or market outcome changes, a consumer may be made better off ( 改善 ) or worse off ( 悪化 ). Economists often want to measure how consumers are affected by these changes, and have developed several tools for the assessment of welfare ( 厚生 ).

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