[PDF] Top 20 学校選択制度AA m2pdf 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... – DA2 : マイノリティのうち優先順位の高い生徒は、学校の 優先順位を超えて入学可能 – DA3 :マイノリティが入学希望した場合、マイノリティだけが 入学できる定員枠を別途設ける。それ以外の定員枠はど ちらの生徒も入学可能 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (e) The social welfare function introduced by Arrow is to derive social UTILITY by adding up individual utilities. 2. Externalities (25 points) Consider a one-consumer, one-firm economy (or equiv- alently an ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. (e) In the simple moral hazard problem we studied in class, the optimal wage (= s( )) is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... are differentiated. After the prices are set, consumers demand 24 − p i + p j 2 units (i 6= j, i = 1, 2) of the good that firm i produces. Assume that each firm’s marginal cost is 6, and the payoff ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) If a player randomizes pure strategies X and Y in a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, she MUST be indi¤erent between choosing X and Y . 2. Monopoly (10 points) Suppose a monopoly …rm operates in two di¤erent ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... R i (or % i ) An individual i’s preference relation on X (an binary relation satisfying completeness and transitivity. → Let P i (or ≻i) and I i (or ∼i) be the associated relations of strict individual preference ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... β(x i ) = c + θx i . (1) Now suppose that player 2 follows the above equilibrium strategy, and we shall check whether player 1 has an incentive to choose the same linear strategy (1). Player 1’s ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1 Nature draws a type t i for the Sender from a set of feasible types T = {t1 , ..., t I} according to a probability distribution p(ti), where p(ti) > 0 for every i and p(t 1 ) + · · · + p(tn) = 1. 2 Sender ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... object for each buyer is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. (a) Suppose that buyer 2 takes a linear strategy, b 2 = v 2 . Then, derive the probability such that buyer 1 wins as ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 4. Question 4 (5 points) Consider a game of election with asymmetric information among voters. Whether candidate A or candidate B is elected depends on the votes of two citizens (denoted by 1 and 2). The economy ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Problem Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...
（一般に）ナッシュ均衡は複数存在する場合がある
プレイヤー全員にとってあるナッシュ均衡よりも別のナッシュ 均衡の方が望ましい場合もある
良い均衡（Mac, Mac）ではなく悪い均衡（ Win , Win ）が選 ばれてしまう危険性がある ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... How to Measure Welfare Change | 厚生の変化をどうはかるか？ When the economic environment or market outcome changes, a consumer may be made better off ( 改善 ) or worse off ( 悪化 ). Economists often want to measure how consumers ... 完全なドキュメントを参照