Klemperer (2002), “How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions,” European Economic Review. Milgrom (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge U Press[r]

22 さらに読み込む

payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’**s** strategy.
Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .
After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L
(step **3**), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

20 さらに読み込む

(1) Write the payoff functions π 1 and π 2 (as a function of p 1 and p 2 ).
(2) Derive the best response function for each player. (**3**) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
(4) Derive the prices (p 1 , p 2 ) that maximize joint-profit, i.e., π 1 + π 2 .

2 さらに読み込む

Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

84 さらに読み込む

Three Firms (1, 2 and **3**) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the same time, their profits become 0. If exactly one firm advertises in the morning, its profit is 1; if exactly one firm advertises in the evening, its profit is 2. Firms must make their daily advertising decisions simultaneously.

2 さらに読み込む

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

(a) Characterize the first-best solution.
(b) Suppose that the seller cannot observe θ: θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } and Pr[θ = θ L ] = β with
0 < θ L < θ H . Set up the seller’**s** optimization problem under this asymmetric
information structure.

2 さらに読み込む

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

A set S in R n is called compact if it is closed and bounded.
Theorem **3** (Weierstrass, Existence of Extreme Values)
Let f : S → R be a continuous real-valued function where S is a non-empty compact subset of R n . Then f has its maximum and minimum values. That is, there exists vectors x and x such that

16 さらに読み込む

Q = K 1 =4
L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions.
(a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’**s** short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’**s**

3 さらに読み込む

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

16 さらに読み込む

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

17 さらに読み込む

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis
( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

27 さらに読み込む

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (**3**)
(Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though
Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice!
Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

27 さらに読み込む

Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r]

16 さらに読み込む

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

18 さらに読み込む

A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

23 さらに読み込む

(b) If consumer’**s** choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour.
(c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then it must be unique whenever the consumer’**s** preference relation is convex.

2 さらに読み込む

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

17 さらに読み込む