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# トップPDF Lec2 6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Lec2 6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models can be seen as particular cases of a more general model of oligopolistic competition where firms choose prices and quantities. Bertrand is more reaso[r] ...

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### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Substituting into p+q = 3=4, we achieve q = 1=2. Since the game is symmetric, we can derive exactly the same result for Player 1’s mixed action as well. Therefore, we get the mixed-strategy Nash ...

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### PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player i values her own house at v i and this is private information. The value of player i’s house to the other player j(6= i) is 3 2 v i . The ...

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### EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ...

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### PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... student s prefers an empty slot at school c to her own assignment, and (nw2) and (nw3) mean that legal constraints are not violated when s is assigned the empty slot without changing other students’ ...

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### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... るい ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ あい あい あい あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき こうき ...

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...

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### Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...

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### PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... or u i ( i ; i ) u i (s i ; i ) for all s i 2 S i . (2) 7. Mixed strategies: Application A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but ...

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### Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... is strictly increasing in its first two arguments and strictly decreasing in b. Thus by increasing pollution, the firm can produce more output (or use less input). The consumer has a concave utility function U (y 1 , y ...

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### Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (d) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. (e) In the simple moral hazard problem we studied in class, the optimal wage (= s( )) is ...

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### Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i ...

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### Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A bargaining situation is described by a tuple hX, D, % 1 , % 2 i: X is a set of possible agreements: a set of possible consequences that the two players can jointly achieve. D ∈ X is the disagreement outcome: the ...

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### Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ...

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### Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...

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### PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...

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