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... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Outcome of JRMP May Violate Weak Stability The same example as before: There are two hospitals h 1 , h 2 in one region with regional cap 10. Each hospital has a capacity of 10 and a target capacity of 5. There ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... is strictly increasing in its first two arguments and strictly decreasing in b. Thus by increasing pollution, the firm can produce more output (or use less input). The consumer has a concave utility function U (y 1 , y ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 5. Bayesian Game (20 points) There are 10 envelopes and each of them contains a number 1 through 10. That is, one envelope contains 1, another envelope contains 2, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. Nash Equilibrium (16 points) Monica and Nancy have formed a business partnership. Each partner must make her e¤ort decision without knowing what e¤ort decision the other player has made. Let m be the amount of e¤ort ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... R i (or % i ) An individual i’s preference relation on X (an binary relation satisfying completeness and transitivity. → Let P i (or ≻i) and I i (or ∼i) be the associated relations of strict individual preference ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... β(x i ) = c + θx i . (1) Now suppose that player 2 follows the above equilibrium strategy, and we shall check whether player 1 has an incentive to choose the same linear strategy (1). Player 1’s ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1 Nature draws a type t i for the Sender from a set of feasible types T = {t1 , ..., t I} according to a probability distribution p(ti), where p(ti) > 0 for every i and p(t 1 ) + · · · + p(tn) = 1. 2 Sender ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... object for each buyer is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. (a) Suppose that buyer 2 takes a linear strategy, b 2 = v 2 . Then, derive the probability such that buyer 1 wins as ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies in which each player i accepts an exchange if and only if the value v i does not exceed some threshold θ i (b) How would your answer to (a) change if ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Open Set and Closed Set (2) Boundary and interior ◮ A point x is called a boundary point of a set S in R n if every ε-ball centered at x contains points in S as well as points not in S. The set of all boundary ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 合理的な豚：分析
子豚には最適戦略（支配戦略）が存在する！
大豚の行動によらず「 待つ 」のが常に最適
子豚が合理的ならば絶対にスイッチを押さない
子豚の「 スイッチを押す 」は可能性から消去される ... 完全なドキュメントを参照