トップPDF PS2 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ...
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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may NOT exist even if the game is …nite. (b) There MAY exist a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is not a Nash equilibrium. (c) Nash bargaining solution ALWAYS requires two ...
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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3. Auction (9 points) Consider a “common-value auction” with two players, where the value of the object being auctioned is identical for both players. Call this value V and suppose that V = v 1 + v 2 , where v i ...
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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Confirm that by choosing the tax t appropriately, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced. (d) Add a second firm with a different production function. Now the consumers observe a pollution level b = b 1 ...
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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...
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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Axiomatic Approach (2) PAR (Pareto Efficiency) Suppose hU, di is a bargaining problem with v, v ′ ∈ U and v ′ i > v i for i = 1, 2. Then f (U, d) 6= v. The axioms SYM and PAR restrict the behavior of ...
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Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...
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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) If a player randomizes pure strategies X and Y in a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, she MUST be indi¤erent between choosing X and Y . 2. Monopoly (10 points) Suppose a monopoly …rm operates in two di¤erent ...
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PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies in which each player i accepts an exchange if and only if the value v i does not exceed some threshold θ i (b) How would your answer to (a) change if ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... β(x i ) = c + θx i . (1) Now suppose that player 2 follows the above equilibrium strategy, and we shall check whether player 1 has an incentive to choose the same linear strategy (1). Player 1’s ...
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Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Rm In essence, the PBE is a solution concept that incorporates sequential rationality and consistency of beliefs. The crucial new feature of PBE due to Kreps and Wilson (1982): Equilibrium no longer consists of ...
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Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Proof Sketch (2): Existence of Pivotal Voter Lemma 3 (Existence of Pivotal Voter) There is a voter n ∗ = n(b) who is extremely pivotal in the sense that by changing his vote at some profile he can move b from the ...
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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ...
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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Suppose a seller auctions one object to two risk neutral buyers, = 1; 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the winner pays a ...
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PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ◮ with probability p, a consumer with wealth x will receive a times of her current wealth x ◮ with probability 1 − p she will receive b times of x. Thm Assume that the assumptions of Pratt’s Theorem holds. Then, ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... （一般に）ナッシュ均衡は複数存在する場合がある プレイヤー全員にとってあるナッシュ均衡よりも別のナッシュ 均衡の方が望ましい場合もある 良い均衡（Mac, Mac）ではなく悪い均衡（ Win , Win ）が選 ばれてしまう危険性がある ...
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Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... How to Measure Welfare Change | 厚生の変化をどうはかるか？ When the economic environment or market outcome changes, a consumer may be made better off ( 改善 ) or worse off ( 悪化 ). Economists often want to measure how consumers ...
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