トップPDF Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Final1 08 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

1. True or False (10 points, moderate) Answer whether each of the following statements is true or false. You DON’T need to explain the reason. (a) Suppose a preference relation % on X is rational. Then, if a set X is …nite, we can always …nd a utility function u(x) that represents %.

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

each prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the lottery p). Let α ◦ x ⊕ (1 − α) ◦ y denote the lottery in which the prize x is realized with probability α and the prize y with 1 − α. Denote by L(S) the (infinite) space containing all lotteries

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices third-degree price discrimination. Group A’s elasticity of demand is ǫ A and

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 (that is, her wealth becomes 25) is 1

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the winner pays the average of the two bids b + b

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibria. You may assume that each firm chooses M with probability p and E with probability 1 − p, then calculate an equilibrium probability, p.

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully rationalizes the above data, and verify that % fails to satisfy transitivity.

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) Show that if u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree r. (b) Show that if u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are quasi-concave, then m(x 1 , x 2 ) := min{u(x 1 , x 2 ), v(x 1 , x 2 )} is also quasi-concave.

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Final1 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r]

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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1) In principle, time/date can be incorporated in the state of nature. Consider an exchange economy with I agents and K goods: Distinguish two dates: date 0 (ex ante), date 1 (ex post). There are S mutually exclusive state of nature.

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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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Final1 09 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 (that is, her wealth becomes 25) is 1

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Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Hint: You can graphically show the claims if you prefer to do so. (b) Derive the critical points (i.e., the combinations satisfying the …rst order con- ditions) of this maximization problem by using Lagrange’s method. (c) What is the (maximum) value function? Is it strictly increasing in a?

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Final1 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination of inputs that achieves a certain given level of output. (corresponds to “indi¤erence curve” in consumer theory.)

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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) Calculate the absolute risk aversion and the relative risk aversion, respectively.

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If a consumer’s preference is complete and transitive, her demand behaviors always satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. (b) Even if a firm’s technology shows increasing return to scale, the marginal product (with respect to some input) can be decreasing.

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its production function is y 2 = √z 1 , where y 2 is the output of consumption good and z 1 is the input of (total) labor. Let the

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