トップPDF Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Final1 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 1. True or False (10 points, moderate) Answer whether each of the following statements is true or false. You DON’T need to explain the reason. (a) Suppose a preference relation % on X is rational. Then, if a set X ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the lottery ...with 1 − ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ...
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Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3. Auction (14 points) Suppose that a seller auctions one object to two buyers, = 1, 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the object. The loser pays nothing while the ...
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en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...
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Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...
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PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...
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Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ...
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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1) In principle, time/date can be incorporated in the state of nature. Consider an exchange economy with I agents and K goods: Distinguish two dates: date 0 (ex ante), date 1 (ex ...
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EX2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Final1 09 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) Solve the pro…t maximization problem in (c), and derive the pro…t function, (p; w 1 ; w 2 ). 4. Uncertainty (10 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her ...
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Midterm1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Hint: You can graphically show the claims if you prefer to do so. (b) Derive the critical points (i.e., the combinations satisfying the …rst order con- ditions) of this maximization problem by using Lagrange’s ...
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Final1 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where ; > 0. Let w 1 ; w 2 > 0 be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following questions. (a) Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If a consumer’s preference is complete and transitive, her demand behaviors always satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. (b) Even if a firm’s technology shows increasing return to scale, the ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...
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