トップPDF Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. (e) In the simple moral hazard problem we studied in class, the optimal wage (= s( )) is ...
3
EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
1
Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ...
14
最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... player 2 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing X and Y , which implies 4q + 6(1 q) = 7(1 q) , 5q = 1 , q = ...player 2 takes X with probability 3=4 (and Y with probability ...
2
最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... student s prefers an empty slot at school c to her own assignment, and (nw2) and (nw3) mean that legal constraints are not violated when s is assigned the empty slot without changing other students’ ...
14
最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... るい ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ あい あい あい あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき こうき ...
70
PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...
2
PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each player’s payo¤ ...
3
PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
1
EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
1
PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or reject ...player ...
2
Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Eco 601E: Advanced Microeconomics II (Fall, 2nd, 2013) Final Exam: January 28 1. Dynamic Game (24 points) Consider the following two-person dynamic game. In the first period, game A is played; after observing ...
2
Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Confirm that by choosing the tax t appropriately, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced. (d) Add a second firm with a different production function. Now the consumers observe a pollution level b = b 1 ...
3
Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...
2
Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ...
11
Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...
16
PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
1
PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...
2
Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... すべてのプレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある 「支配される戦略の逐次消去」（後述） （お互いの行動に関する）「正しい予想の共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ...
20
Game11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY AND COLLUSION Consider the Cournot duopoly model in Chapter 10, with two irms that each produce at zero cost (which I assume just to make the computations easy), and suppose the market price is given by ...
5