トップPDF PQ3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

PQ3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PQ3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would like: Let a and b be the amount of pizza requested by Ann and Bob, respectively (you can assume that a and b are integer numbers between 1 and 3). If a + b ≤ 3, then each player gets her/his requested demands (and the owner eats any leftover slices). If a + b > 3, then both players get nothing. Assume that each players payoff is equal to the number of slices of pizza; that is, the more the better.
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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(5) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period payoff. (6) Now suppose that the game is played infinitely many times: payoff of each player is discounted sum of each period payoff with some discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Assume specifically that A = 16, c = 8. Then, derive the condition under which the trigger strategy sustains the joint-profit maximizing prices you derived in (3) (as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium).
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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.   Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .   After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

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MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

 Klemperer (2002), “How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions,” European Economic Review.  Milgrom (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge U Press[r]

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PS2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) Characterize the first-best solution. (b) Suppose that the seller cannot observe θ: θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } and Pr[θ = θ L ] = β with 0 < θ L < θ H . Set up the seller’s optimization problem under this asymmetric information structure.

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EX2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’s short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’s

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Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

A function f : D (⊂ R n ) → R is called 1 continuous at a point x 0 if, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that d(x, x 0 ) < δ implies that d(f (x), f (x 0 )) < ε. 2 continuous if it is continuous at every point in its domain. 3 uniformly continuous if, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis     ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!    Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)    (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!   Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).   Ber[r]

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Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then it must be unique whenever the consumer’s preference relation is convex.

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