第 9 章 株主の権限行使② 裁判所の機能
10.4 最後に
以上みてきたように、本稿が積み残した課題は少なくないが、企業買収が継続的に増加 する傾向にある今日において、本稿が、企業買収の場面における買収対象会社の株主と取 締役との間の利害状況に関する議論や、買収対象会社の取締役に対する規律づけのあり方 に関する議論の進展に、少しでも貢献することができれば幸いである。
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