トップPDF Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1) In principle, time/date can be incorporated in the state of nature. Consider an exchange economy with I agents and K goods: Distinguish two dates: date 0 (ex ante), date 1 (ex post). There are S mutually exclusive state of nature.

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

現象 プレイヤー プレイヤー プレイヤー プレイヤー 「協力」 「協力」 「協力」 「協力」 「裏切り」 「裏切り」 「裏切り」 「裏切り」 軍拡競争 国 軍縮 軍拡 国際貿易政策 国 関税引き下げ 税率据え置き 男女間協力 カップル 相手に従う 相手に要求

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. (You can use (b) and De Morgan’s Law without proofs.)

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If a consumer’s preference is complete and transitive, her demand behaviors always satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. (b) Even if a firm’s technology shows increasing return to scale, the marginal product (with respect to some input) can be decreasing.

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Suppose % is a preference relation on X. Then, show the followings. (a) Re‡exive: For any x 2 X, x x. (b) Transitive 1: For any x; y; z 2 X, if x y and y z, then x z. (c) Transitive 2: For any x; y; z 2 X, if x y and y z, then x z. (d) Transitive 3:For any x; y; z 2 X, if x y and y % z, then x % z. where and are de…ned as follows:

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would like: Let a and b be the amount of pizza requested by Ann and Bob, respectively (you can assume that a and b are integer numbers between 1 and 3). If a + b ≤ 3, then each player gets her/his requested demands (and the owner eats any leftover slices). If a + b > 3, then both players get nothing. Assume that each players payoff is equal to the number of slices of pizza; that is, the more the better.
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Micro1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

where x is a vector of choice variables, and a := (a 1 , ..., a m ) is a vector of parameters ( パラメータ ) that may enter the objective function and constraint. Suppose that for each vector a, the solution is unique and denoted by x(a). ◮ A maximum-value function, denoted by M (a), is defined as follows:

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

“Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r]

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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EX1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ products are differentiated. After the prices are set, consumers demand A − p 1 + p 2

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lotteries (1) We consider preferences and choices over the set of “lotteries.” Let S be a set of consequences (prizes). We assume that S is a finite set and the number of its elements (= |S|) is S. A lottery p is a function that assigns a nonnegative number to

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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

4. Exchange Economy (12 points) Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, 1 and 2, have the following indirect utility functions: v 1 (p 1 , p 2 , ω ) = ln ω − a ln p 1 − (1 − a) ln p 2

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its production function is y 2 = √z 1 , where y 2 is the output of consumption good and z 1 is the input of (total) labor. Let the

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices third-degree price discrimination. Group A’s elasticity of demand is ǫ A and

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each subject. After eating, sleeping, exercising, and maintaining some human contact, you will have T hours each day in which to study for your exams. You have …gured out that your grade point average (G) from your two courses takes the form

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