トップPDF syllabus game14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

syllabus game14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus game14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  1. Course Description    This  is  an  introductory  course  in  game  theory,  which  will  provide  you  with  mathematical  tools  for  analyzing  strategic  situations  ‐  your  optimal  decision  depends  on what other people will do. In particular, we will study central solution concepts in  game  theory  such  as  Nash  equilibrium,  subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  and  Bayesian  equilibrium. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important analytical tool  in such fields as economics, management, political science, phycology and biology. To  illustrate  its  analytical  value,  we  will  cover  a  variety  of  applications  that  include  international relations, development, business competition, auctions, marriage market,  and  so  forth.  There  is  no  prerequisite  for  this  course,  although  some  background  on  microeconomics and familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful. 
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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r]

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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ALWAYS derives optimal solutions for any optimization

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Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

An Arrow-Debreu security is a contract that agrees to pay one unit of a numeraire (a currency or a commodity) if a particular state of nature occurs and pays zero in all the other states. Suppose there exist no market for contingent commodities, but Arrow-Debreu securities for all state s ∈ S are exchanged at t = 0.

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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

 政府(官僚組織、政治家)はどのように行動するか?  政治経済学 政治経済学 政治経済学 政治経済学  私企業中でなにが起こっているか?  組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス) 組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス) 組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス) 組織経済学、企業統治(コーポレート・ガバナンス)

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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

X c∈C max n 0, q τ(ˆ c s) − |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c) \ {ˆ s}| o holds for any step l in the cycle, at any school c which ˆ s is admitted, q τ(ˆ c s) = |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c)| holds for any step l in the cycle. Hence, ˆ ss rejected status for any school which ˆ s once proposed to cannot change to the non-rejected status by reproposal conditions (i) or (iii). Moreover, since a student s such that s ∈ S τ(ˆ s) and f (ˆ s) < f (s) cannot be assigned to a school which ˆ s prefers to her own assignment, reproposal condition (ii) does not apply to ˆ s. Therefore, ˆ s is always assigned to the same school in the cycle. Now we can separate the set of students who are always unfree because they do not change their assignments in the cycle. With the set of students who are always free in the cycle, only the reproposal condition (iii) could apply and it is when there was a reproposal before step t ′ . But a reproposal based on (iii) gives
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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(b) Let p be a probability that player 2 would choose Rock, and q be a probability that she chooses Paper. Note that her probability of choosing Scissors is written as 1 p q. Under mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, player 1 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing Rock, Paper and Scissors, which implies that these three actions must give him the same expected payo¤s. Let u R ; u P ; u S be his expected payo¤s by selecting

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would like: Let a and b be the amount of pizza requested by Ann and Bob, respectively (you can assume that a and b are integer numbers between 1 and 3). If a + b ≤ 3, then each player gets her/his requested demands (and the owner eats any leftover slices). If a + b > 3, then both players get nothing. Assume that each players payoff is equal to the number of slices of pizza; that is, the more the better.
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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ products are differentiated. After the prices are set, consumers demand A − p 1 + p 2

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If a consumer’s preference is complete and transitive, her demand behaviors always satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. (b) Even if a firm’s technology shows increasing return to scale, the marginal product (with respect to some input) can be decreasing.

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’s short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’s

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then it must be unique whenever the consumer’s preference relation is convex.

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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

安田予想で未受賞候補者たち   Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ!   Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうか?   Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい…   Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう…

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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.   Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

θb + (1 − θ)b ′ where b is the winner’s bid, b ′ is the loser’s bid, and θ is some constant satisfying 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block for each company is independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

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syllabus game15 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus game15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  1. Course Description    This  is  an  introductory  course  in  game  theory,  which  will  provide  you  with  mathematical  tools  for  analyzing  strategic  situations  ‐  your  optimal  decision  depends  on what other people will do. In particular, we will study central solution concepts in  game  theory  such  as  Nash  equilibrium,  subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  and  Bayesian  equilibrium. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important analytical tool  in such fields as economics, management, political science, phycology and biology. To  illustrate  its  analytical  value,  we  will  cover  a  variety  of  applications  that  include  international relations, development, business competition, auctions, marriage market,  and  so  forth.  There  is  no  prerequisite  for  this  course,  although  some  background  on  microeconomics and familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful. 
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Final14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

C) Now suppose that the rule of the game is modified as follows. If exchange occurs,  each  individual  receives  3  times  as  much  amount  as  the  bill  she  will  have.  For  example, if individual 1 receives $5 and 2 receives $10 initially and both wish to  exchange,  then  1  will  receive  $30  (=  $10  x  3)  and  2  will  receive  $15  (=  $5  x  3).  Nothing  happens  if  they  do  not  exchange.  Then,  does  trade  occur  in  a  Bayesian  Nash equilibrium? Explain. 

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