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Game Theory (2013‐14) 

   

Course number: ECO290E 

Instructor: Yosuke YASUDA (yosuke.yasuda@gmail.com)  Term / Time / Room: Winter / Tuesdays 1st and 2nd / 5L   

Course web: https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda/Home/teaching/game13     

 

1. Course Description   

This  is  an  introductory  course  in  game  theory,  which  will  provide  you  with  mathematical  tools  for  analyzing  strategic  situations  ‐  your  optimal  decision  depends  on what other people will do. In particular, we will study central solution concepts in  game  theory  such  as  Nash  equilibrium,  subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  and  Bayesian  equilibrium. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important analytical tool  in such fields as economics, management, political science, phycology and biology. To  illustrate  its  analytical  value,  we  will  cover  a  variety  of  applications  that  include  international relations, development, business competition, auctions, marriage market,  and  so  forth.  There  is  no  prerequisite  for  this  course,  although  some  background  on  microeconomics and familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful. 

   

2. Course Outline   

1: Introduction and motivation  2: Static games and Nash equilibrium 

3: Why and how is Nash equilibrium reached?  4: Static games with continuous strategies  5: Mixed strategy equilibrium 

6: Dynamic games and backward induction  7: Midterm exam (90 minutes, 50 points)  8: Games in extensive‐form 

9: Applications of dynamic games  10: Repeated games 

11: Static games of incomplete information  12: Applications of incomplete information games  13: Behavioral game theory 

14: Introduction to market design  15: Final exam (90 minutes, 50 points)   

 

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3. Grading   

Course grade will be determined by combining grades on a midterm exam (50%) and a  final exam (50%). There is NO take‐home assignment. 

   

4. Textbooks   

There  is  NO  official  textbook  for  the  class.  While  lecture  notes  are  the  main  material  for  the  class,  the  books  listed  below  might  be  useful  if  you  need  supplementary  readings. 

 

The following introductory textbooks contain full of intuitive explanations:   

Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley, Games of Strategy, 3rd, 2009  Joel Watson, Strategy, 3rd, 2013 

 

If  you  want  to  understand  game  theory  in  more  lucid  way,  the  next  two  books  are  recommended. The first one is concise, while the second is more accessible. 

 

Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, 1992  Steven Tadelis, Game Theory: An Introduction, 2012 

 

Those  of  you  interested  in  pursuing  the  subject  further  may  consult  the  following  advanced and authoritative sources. 

 

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, 1991 

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, 1994 

(You can download it for free: http://theory.economics.utoronto.ca/books/)   

The following books contain many examples of game theory in action, both in business  and in everyday life. The last one also serves as an introduction to market design. 

 

Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff, Co‐Opetition, 1996  Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, The Art of Strategically, 2008  Preston McAfee, Competitive Solutions, 2002 

John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers, 1992  John McMillan, Reinventing the Bazaar, 2002 

 

Finally,  the  following  textbook  provides  a  lively  introduction  to  the  game‐theoretic  perspective on economic development. 

 

Bruce Wydick, Games in Economic Development, 2007 

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