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トップPDF PS2 2and3 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website PS2 2and3 Solution

PS2 2and3 Solution 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website PS2 2and3 Solution

PS2 2and3 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website PS2 2and3 Solution

... 1 and 2, each own a ...i and this is private information. The value of player i’s house to the other player j(6= i) is 3 2 v i ...

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PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant ...

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PS2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ...

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PS2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2. Question 2 (9 points) Consider a game between two friends, Amy and Brenda. Amy wants Brenda to give her a ride to the mall. Brenda has no interest in going to the mall unless her favorite shoes ...

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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) ...function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree ...

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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) ...function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree ...

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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 2: Due on May 10 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2012) 1. Question 1 (2 points) Suppose the production function f satisfies (i) f (0) = 0, (ii) increasing, (iii) con- tinuous, (iv) ...

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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...

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PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 2: Due on May 14 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (6 points) (a) Suppose the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, show that the associated ...

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PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the ...

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PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... α and β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α and candidate B is best if the state is ...symmetric and given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other ...

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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium ALWAYS exists when the game is finite. (b) ANY sequential equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. (c) The situation of asymmetric information is called “hidden action” if the ...

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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... U and v ′ i > v i for i = 1, ...SYM and PAR restrict the behavior of the solution on single bargaining problems, while INV and IIA require the solution to exhibit some consistency ...

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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 1. True or False (9 points) Answer whether each of the following statements is true (T) or false (F). You do NOT need to explain the reason. (a) The backward induction solution coincides with the subgame perfect ...

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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may NOT exist even if the game is …nite. (b) There MAY exist a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is not a Nash equilibrium. (c) Nash bargaining solution ALWAYS requires two ...

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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company ...

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Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...

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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of asymmetric Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive ...

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Lec2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Second degree price discrimination (or nonlinear pricing) Prices differ depending on the number of units of the good bought, but not across consumers from the beginning. Each consumer faces the same price schedule, but ...

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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2. Duopoly (15 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , ...

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