# トップPDF PS2 2and3 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website PS2 2and3 Solution

### PS2 2and3 Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website PS2 2and3 Solution

**and**

**2**, each own a ...i

**and**this is private information. The value of player i’

**s**house to the other player j(6= i) is

**3**

**2**v i ...

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### PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**to L

**3**.

**3**. Question

**3**(4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant ...

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### PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**and**

**2**(receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player

**2**where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’

**s**own share. Player

**2**can decide whether accept the offer or ...

2

### PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**. Question

**2**(9 points) Consider a game between two friends, Amy

**and**Brenda. Amy wants Brenda to give her a ride to the mall. Brenda has no interest in going to the mall unless her favorite shoes ...

2

### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) ...function

**and**h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree ...

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) ...function

**and**h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree ...

1

### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Due on May 10 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2012) 1. Question 1 (

**2**points) Suppose the production function f satisfies (i) f (0) = 0, (ii) increasing, (iii) con- tinuous, (iv) ...

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**: Due on May 14 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (6 points) (a) Suppose the utility function is continuous

**and**strictly increasing. Then, show that the associated ...

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### PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**effort

**and**x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x

**2**≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the ...

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### PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**and**β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α

**and**candidate B is best if the state is ...symmetric

**and**given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other ...

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### Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**and**v ′ i > v i for i = 1, ...SYM

**and**PAR restrict the behavior of the

**solution**on single bargaining problems, while INV

**and**IIA require the

**solution**to exhibit some consistency ...

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### Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**solution**coincides with the subgame perfect ...

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### Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**solution**ALWAYS requires two ...

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### Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**. The companies submit bids simultaneously,

**and**the company ...

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### Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...

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### Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**and**other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive ...

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### Lec2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**. Duopoly (15 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1

**and**Firm

**2**, simultaneously

**and**independently select their own prices, p 1

**and**p

**2**, ...

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