[PDF] Top 20 MOF2013 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Jeしせe and ７enと 2011 , Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd edじ下じon.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... • Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., and Sönmez, T. [2006] “Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access,” mimeo. • Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and Sönmez, T. [2013] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore  ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
 (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis
 ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prove that if a firm exhibits increasing returns to scale then average cost must strictly decrease with output. 4.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照