... Jeしせe and ７enと 2011 , Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd edじ下じon.[r] ...

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... • Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., and Sönmez, T. [2006] “Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access,” mimeo. • Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and Sönmez, T. [**2013**] ...

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... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore ...

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... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

18

... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...

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... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’**s** strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

20

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

17

... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

20

... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’**s** dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...

3

... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...

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... Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r] ...

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... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

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... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’**s** wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’**s** preference ...

2

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

16

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...

20

... Prove that if a firm exhibits increasing returns to scale then average cost must strictly decrease with output. 4.[r] ...

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... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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