[PDF] Top 20 Lecture note 3 最近の更新履歴 Keisuke Kawata's HP

... Price posting model: Sellers post (and commit) price before search activity. ← Straightforward way of endogenous value distribution • Let start from a simple labor market model where 2 firms (j=A,B) and L workers. • Fi ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2.4 実証研究 2.4.1 雇用量、賃金への影響 Card & Krueger (1994, American Economic Review) : アメリカ ニュージャージーでは 1992 年 ４月、最低賃金が $4.25 から$5.05 まで増加された。対して隣接し、かつ経済構造が似ているペンシル ベニア州では、最低賃金は変更されなかった。このイベントを用いた推計では、最低賃金によって、 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... variable is less than or equal to a particular value. e.g., ) The cumulative probability distribution of the high of the next new person. you meet. Cumulative probability : Continuous ra[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Binary case: � is the estimator of of y between t=1 and t=0 groups when the effect of other factors (u) is totally equal between groups.3. Heteroskedasticity and Homoskedasticity[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... • Outside option (value of unemployed) is determined by market tightness and the wage distribution ← market level variable and sufficient to characterize the match level variable (wag[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1. Wage dispersion as a result of firm heterogeneity ← Higher productivity firms. pay higher wage.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Wage dispersion: Standard mincer equation (wage is explained by education level and labor market experience) cannot explain almost part of the wage variation5. “tru tural u e plo e t: [r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... ⇒ We a argue so if it is a rare e e t that e o ser e our urre t sa ple under the null hypothesis; the population mean is equal to � �,0 . ⇒ It’s easure e t is the pro a ilit that e o ser e sa ples hi h ha e ore e ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Definition: equilibrium • Fi ’s e t de isio -making can be characterized by threshold strategy: a firm entries the market if and only if � ≥ ത�. • The market equilibrium is defined over { � , � , ത�} and ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Main finding • The discussion can be extend more general cases; the number of alternative is more than 3 (but still finite number), and/or risk averse agent. → The job-acceptance (stopping) probability is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... f (x, a) s.t. g(x, a) = 0. where x is a vector of choice variables, and a := (a 1 , ..., a m ) is a vector of parameters that may enter the objective function, the constraint, or both. Suppose that for each vector ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Derive the competitive equilibrium (both price w ∗ and allocation x ∗ ). (d) Now consider an exchange economy with n consumers and k goods. We de- note the bundle of total endowments by ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω k ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the players ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... M P 1 : max q≥0 p(q)q − c(q). where p(q)q is a revenue and c(q) is a cost when the output is fixed to q. Let π(q) = p(q)q − c(q) denote the revenue function. Assume that the firm’s objective function π(q) is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Decision under Uncertainty | 不確実性下の意思決定 We have so far not distinguished between individual’s actions and consequences, but many choices made by agents take place under conditions of uncertainty. This ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the players ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... M P 1 : max q≥0 p(q)q − c(q). where p(q)q is a revenue and c(q) is a cost when the output is fixed to q. Let π(q) = p(q)q − c(q) denote the revenue function. Assume that the firm’s objective function π(q) is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Bibliography II Michal N´ an´ asi, Tom´ aˇs Vinaˇr, and Broˇ na Brejov´ a. The highest expected reward decoding for hmms with application to recombination detection. In Proc. of CPM’10, pages 164–176, 2010. I. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... The choice function C does not need to be observable.. 3.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A; X) and (B; Y ). (d) Let p be a probability that player 2 chooses X and q be a probability that player 1 chooses A. Since player 1 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing A ... 完全なドキュメントを参照