Top PDF Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 2. Walras’s Law: If the preferences are monotonic, then any solution x to the consumer problem B(p, ω) is located on its budget line, i.e., px(p, ω) = ω. 3. Continuity: If % is a continuous preference, then the ...
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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Through repeated play of games, experience can generate a common belief among players. Examples[r] ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 安田予想で未受賞の候補者たち Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ！ Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうのか？ Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織の経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう… ...
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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
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Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Review of Lecture 5 Indifference property in mixed strategy NE. If a player chooses more than one strategy with positive probability, she must be indifferent among such pure strategies: choosing any of them ...
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Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...
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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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EX3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...
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PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...
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Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is ...
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