... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

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... 2. Walras’**s** Law: If the preferences are monotonic, then any solution x to the consumer problem B(p, ω) is located on its budget line, i.e., px(p, ω) = ω. 3. Continuity: If % is a continuous preference, then the ...

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... Through repeated play of games, experience can generate a common belief among players. Examples[r] ...

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... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’**s** law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’**s** Method You have two …nal exams ...

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... 安田予想で未受賞**の**候補者たち Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ！ Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらう**の**か？ Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織**の**経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう… ...

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... Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...

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... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

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... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

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... Review of Lecture **5** Indifference property in mixed strategy NE. If a player chooses more than one strategy with positive probability, she must be indifferent among such pure strategies: choosing any of them ...

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... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...

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... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’**s** strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

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... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

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... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’**s** dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...

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... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...

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... **5**. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $**5**, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is ...

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