トップPDF Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Zermelo’s Theorem Thm For any finite perfect information games, there exist at least one backward induction solution in pure strategies. Furthermore, if payoffs differ between any two different strategy profiles, ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Preferences To construct a model of individual choice, the notion of preferences plays a central role in economic theory, which specifies the form of consistency or inconsistency in the person’s choices. We view ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at2. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
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Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...
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Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.). Ber[r] ...
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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem. Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？ Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたのは好材料？ Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？ 清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (b) Now suppose there are n(> 2) individuals. Then, can we find a competitive equilibrium? (How) Does your answer depend on n? 4. Question 4 (8 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann ...
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Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore ...
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