Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 68, No. 3, March 2020 （110）
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A Study of a Buddhist-Jainist Dispute over
Non-conceptual Cognition
K
ANEKO Naoya1. Introduction
In Tattvasaṃgraha s (TS) 17th chapter k. 1264–1284, Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) defends the non-conceptuality of perception (pratyakṣa) ̶ which he has demonstrated up to k. 1263̶against a Jainist s criticism. Digambara school scholar Sumati cited in this passage maintains the existence of two kinds of perception, that is, non-con-ceptual direct perception and connon-con-ceptual perception and argues that the former pertains to the universal of high degree such as Being itself (sattā), while the latter to the universal of low degree and the particular. Against this, given the fact that perception of individual things is precisely non-conceptual, Śāntarakṣita replies that because the universal has a re-lationship of mutual exclusion (anyonyaparihāra) with the particular, on the contrary, it fol-lows that the universal can be grasped by conceptual cognition. This dispute has already been introduced by Hattori 1959, but at that time, the background of Sumati s thought was not clear enough.However, later studies have brought new information about the master-disciple linage of Jainist order and Jainist epistemology. For example, it became clear that their epistemol-ogy has the traditional four-stages theory of sense cognition (matijñāna) and five-stages theory rearranged by Jainist logicians: in the former perception (avagraha) is non-concep-tual, and in the latter intuition (darśana) is non-conceptual but perception arising from it is conceptual. The four-stages theory consists of perception, desire (īhā), determination (apāya) and remembrance (dhāraṇā) (TAAS I k. 15), while the five-stages theory adds in-tuition as its first stage. It seems to be Pūjyapāda (5–7 c) who adds the inin-tuition before the four-stages (cf. Nagasaki 1988, 86). Moreover, though originally sense cognition was not viewed as perception, later it has come to be viewed so in an empirical sense. Pūjyapāda thinks that akṣa perceiving its object means ātman (SAS 72,2, cf. Nagasaki 1988, 8–9 and Satō 2005, 758–756). But Siddhasena Divākara (6–7 c) and Jinabhadra (6–7 c) introduced the understanding of perception based on two truths and it is transmitted to Akalaṅka (ca.
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720–780) (cf. Uno A. 1965, 174; 178–181). Based on these informations, in this article I will try to make the background of Sumati s thought clear by analyzing the dispute be-tween Śāntarakṣita and Sumati over their understanding of non-conceptual cognition.
2. About Sumati s time and thought
Sumati is known through epigraphs as one of the monks of Dramila/Drāviḍa Saṃgha belonging to the Digambara school of southern In-dia (cf. Jain 1964, 166–168; Uno T. 2009, 9–10). His name is inscribed as Sumatibhaṭṭāraka in Belūr epigraph, and as Sumatideva in Candragiri epigraph (cf. JŚLS III 7,23–8,7; JŚLS I 102,7–104,14, Uno T. 2009, 9–10). From this, he can be regarded as a member of disciples lineage of Samantabhadra (7 c) and Pātrakesarin (7 c?), or a member of masters lineage of Akalaṅka.According to TS/TSP, Sumati seems to have the following views: (1) Real entity (vas-tu) contains two essences: the universal and the particular. Moreover, the universal has two kinds: one not qualified like Being itself and one qualified like cowness; the former is the object of non-conceptual perception, while the latter and the particular of conceptual per-ception (TSP 463, 18–21). (2) Sense cognition of individual things is not non-conceptual in virtue of the fact that, being a cognition which grasps qualified object by excluding a cer-tain object from others, it means conceptual (TS 1267; TS 1269). (3) Furthermore, the uni-versal cannot ontologically be distinguished from the particular; as a result, one grasps the universal by ignoring individual things respective own nature (TS 1268; TS 1275).
3. Jainist documents
The above mentioned three points correspond to the ideas maintained by the following Jaina scholars: (1) Śvetāmbara school maintains that, as the first stage of sense cognition, perception grasps the universal apart from genus and particu-lar aspect etc. Though not being called Being itself, the universal is nevertheless an object free from conceptual construction and is consequently the universal of high degree not dis-tinguished from others. The one who firstly refers to this kind of universal is Jinabhadra, and Siddhasena Gaṇi (7–10 c) develops his idea (cf. Satō 1998a, 76; VĀBhSV I 57, 9–12, TAASBhṬ 80, 19–21). Moreover, Jinabhadra classifies the perception which grasps its ob-ject (arthāvagraha) into two kinds and explains that the ultimate perception grasps the uni-versal (VĀBhSV I 63, 21–22), while the empirical perception the particular (VĀBhSV I 64, 13–15). As for Siddharṣi (10 c.), he clearly explains the system of the universal and the particular which places the Being itself at the top (NAV 442, 9–17). On the other hand, al-though Digambara school s system of the universal and the particular is not clear,（112）
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Akalaṅka thinks that intuition which is prior to sense cognition grasps Being itself, while perception the particular (LT k. 5, LTSV 116, 1–2). However, we cannot identify this intu-ition with non-conceptual perception. This is so because even if sense cognintu-ition is regard-ed as perception, it is thought to be conceptual (sākāra) without exception according to Jainist logicians definition (cf. Andō 1985, 31–34). (2) In the commentary on TAAS I k. 17, Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka think that perception is conceptual and grasps the object qual-ified by qualifier (SAS 80,4, TAV 65,28). But in Śvetāmbara school there seems to be no consensus on conceptual perception. (3) Jinabhadra maintains that the universal is grasped by ignoring all kind of particulars (VĀBhSV I 42, 14–15).
4. Conclusion
(a) Sumati acknowledges the sense cognition as perception. This posi-tion has been held by Siddhasena Divākara and Śvetāmbara school scholar Jinabhadra and was transmitted also to Digambara school scholar Akalaṅka. (b) His view is rather similar to both the ontological system and the theory of the universal of high degree as the object of non-conceptual perception developed by Śvetāmbara school. As for Akalaṅka, we can see his terminology comparable to Sumati s in his original work LT. (c) Regarding the ex-planation of conceptual perception, it clearly coincides with that of Digambara school. (d) It is not clear whether Sumati adopts as his epistemology the traditional four-stages theory or the rearranged five-stages theory. This is because Sumati s thought introduced in TS/TSP does not contain the original terminology and consequently it is possible for Buddhists to misunderstand the notion of intuition by considering it as non-conceptual perception.Abbreviations
JŚLS I: Jainaśilālekhasaṃgraha, vol 1. Ed. Hiralal Jain. Bombay: Maṇikacandra Digambara Jainagranthamālāsamiti, 1926.
JŚLS III: Jainaśilālekhasaṃgraha, vol 3. Ed. Paṇḍita Vijayamūrti. Mumbai: Maṇikacandra Digambara Jainagranthamālāsamiti, 1957.
LT: Laghīyastraya, Akalaṅka. See NKC.
NAV: Nyāyāvatāravivṛti, Siddharṣi. Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Criti-cal Edition and English Translation of LogiCriti-cal-EpistemologiCriti-cal Treatises: Nyāyavatāra, Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti and Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana with Introduction and Notes. 2 vols. Ed. Piotr P.
Bal-cerowicz. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2001.
NKC: Nyāyakumudacandra, Prabhācandra. Nyāya-kumuda-candra of Śrīmat Prabhācandrācārya: A
Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva s Laghīyastraya. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Nyāya Śāstri. Delhi: Sri
Satguru Publications, 1991.
SAS: Sarvārthasiddhi, Pūjyapāda. Sarvārthasiddhiḥ: Śrīmadācāryagrddhapicchapraṇītasya Tattvārthasūtrasya Vṛttiḥ. Ed. Siddhāntācārya Phūlacandra Śāstrī. Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha
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TAAS: Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, Umāsvāti. See SAS, TAV, TAASBhṬ.
TAASBhṬ: Tattvārthādhigamasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā, Siddhasena Gaṇi. Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (A Treatise on
the Fundamental Principles of Jainism) by Śrī Umāsvāti Vāchaka: Together with His Connective Verses Commented upon by Śrī Devaguptasūri & Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi and His own Gloss Elucidated by Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi, part 1. Ed. Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia. Bombay: Jivanchand Sakerchand
Ja-veri, 1926.
TAV: Tattvārthavārttika, Akalaṅka. Tattvārthavārtikam (Rājavārtikam): Hindīsārasahitam, part 1. Ed. Mahendrakumāra Jaina. Nayī Dillī: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha, 1953.
TS/TSP: Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, Kamalaśīla. Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commen-tary Pañjikā of Shrī Kamalashīla. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series
1, 2. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.
VĀBh: Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvopajñavṛtti, Jinabhadra. Śrījinabhadragaṇikṣamāśramaṇaviracitaṃ Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyaṃ: Svopajñavrttisahitam, part 1. Ed. Dalsukh Malvania. Ahmedabad: Lalbhai
Dalpatbhai Bharatiya Sanskriti Vidyamandira, 1966.
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Key words Śāntarakṣita, Sumati, pratyakṣa, avagraha
