... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L **2** to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

2

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L **2** to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

2

... u **2** (x, y **2** ) = **2** ln x + y **2** ...persons **1** and **2** when he buys x, and thinks only of his own utility maximization ...persons **1** and **2** buy? (b) Use the Samuelson ...

2

... あい **1** 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき **2** 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき ...

70

... The main theorem shows that the condition that a schools’ priority profile ≻ C has a common priority order for every type t ∈ T is sufficient for the existence of feasible assignments which are both fair and ...

14

... player **2** chooses X and q be a probability that player **1** chooses ...player **1** must be indi¤erent amongst choosing A and B, we obtain **2**p = p + 3(**1** p) , 4p = 3 , p = ...

2

... −**1** , which is clearly decreasing in x. **2**. Question **2** (5 points) (a) (i) No. Although her choice is not inconsistent with risk aversion, this infor- mation alone is not enough for us to judge if she ...

5

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’**s** choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

... (c) Solving the consumer problem you derived in (b), find the competitive equi- librium allocation. (d) Assume that the government tries to achieve the equitable allocation, i.e., each consumer receives two units of both ...

2

... St Petersburg Paradox (**1**) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P **s**∈S p(**s**)**s**. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ...

15

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...

20

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...

2

... Let w = (w **1** , w **2** , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...

2

... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each player’**s** payo¤ ...

3