# Top PDF PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website ### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

2 ### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

2 ### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u 2 (x, y 2 ) = 2 ln x + y 2 ...persons 1 and 2 when he buys x, and thinks only of his own utility maximization ...persons 1 and 2 buy? (b) Use the Samuelson ...

2 ### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき ...

70 ### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... The main theorem shows that the condition that a schools’ priority profile ≻ C has a common priority order for every type t ∈ T is sufficient for the existence of feasible assignments which are both fair and ...

14 ### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... player 2 chooses X and q be a probability that player 1 chooses ...player 1 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing A and B, we obtain 2p = p + 3(1 p) , 4p = 3 , p = ...

2 ### PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... −1 , which is clearly decreasing in x. 2. Question 2 (5 points) (a) (i) No. Although her choice is not inconsistent with risk aversion, this infor- mation alone is not enough for us to judge if she ...

5 ### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27 ### Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (c) Solving the consumer problem you derived in (b), find the competitive equi- librium allocation. (d) Assume that the government tries to achieve the equitable allocation, i.e., each consumer receives two units of both ...

2 ### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ...

15 ### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1 ### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1 ### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1 ### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1 ### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1 ### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1 ### Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...

20 ### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...

2 ### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...

2 ### PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each player’s payo¤ ...

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