# トップPDF Midterm12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Midterm12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

2

### Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

16

### Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**property depends in part on the beauty of ...

2

### en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

84

### Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**good and A − p 2 + p 1 2 units of the firm 2’

**s**good. Assume that the firms have identical (and constant) marginal costs c(< A), and the payoff for each firm is equal to the ...

2

### PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3

### PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then ...

2

### Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**の**候補者たち Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ！ Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらう

**の**か？ Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織

**の**経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう… ...

21

### MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

49

### Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

20

### Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

17

### Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

23

### Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

18

### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**mixed action as well. Therefore, we get the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: both ...

2

### Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

16

### Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

20

### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

27

### Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

17

### Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

20