[PDF] Top 20 Lecture note 2 最近の更新履歴 Keisuke Kawata's HP

... 2. Main finding • The discussion can be extend more general cases; the number of alternative is more than 3 (but still finite number), and/or risk averse agent. → The job-acceptance (stopping) probability is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Definition: equilibrium • Fi ’s e t de isio -making can be characterized by threshold strategy: a firm entries the market if and only if � ≥ ത�. • The market equilibrium is defined over { � , � , ത�} ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1. Wage dispersion as a result of firm heterogeneity ← Higher productivity firms. pay higher wage.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Price posting model: Sellers post (and commit) price before search activity. ← Straightforward way of endogenous value distribution • Let start from a simple labor market model where 2 firms (j=A,B) and L ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... • Kircher, P., & Wright, R., & Julien, B., & Guerrieri, V., (2017) Directed Search: A Guided Tour. Discussion paper • Chade, H., Eeckhout, J., & Smith, L. (2017). Sorting through search and matching ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... ⇒ We a argue so if it is a rare e e t that e o ser e our urre t sa ple under the null hypothesis; the population mean is equal to � �,0 . ⇒ It’s easure e t is the pro a ilit that e o ser e sa ples hi h ha e ore e ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Human capital investment • Human capital investment is an important channel to determine the productivity. • Becker (1962) shows classical argument with the perfect competitive market. General human capital: A ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Hint: Note that every stage game above is a prisoner’s dilemma. You can focus on the trigger strategy, i.e., players choose a stage game Nash equilibrium (D; D) as a punishment whenever someone has once deviated ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Duopoly (15 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Mechanism Design This lecture is mostly based on Chapter 14 “Mechanism Design” of Tadelis (2013). There are many economic and political situations in which some central authority wishes to implement a decision ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Open Set and Closed Set (2) Boundary and interior ◮ A point x is called a boundary point of a set S in R n if every ε-ball centered at x contains points in S as well as points not in S. The set of all boundary ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that can achieve (U, L) is the first period? If so, describe the equilibrium strategies. If not, explain why. 2. Duopoly (32 points) Consider a duopoly game in which ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Hint: Note that a set of (y 1 , y 2 , b) such that G(·) = 0 yields a production frontier. (a) Write down the first-order conditions for the socially optimal production plan and pollution level. (b) Assume there is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the players ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Any finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 2. Expected Utility (16 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert effort or not. Her initial wealth is $100 and the cost of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. (e) In the simple moral hazard problem we studied in class, the optimal wage (= s( )) is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Suppose a government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neutral mobile phone companies, i = 1; 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with higher bid receives a spectrum block. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? 4. Mixed Strategy (15 points) Three …rms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照