トップPDF Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lec6 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

16 さらに読み込む

Lec6 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant. ◮ A decrease in the own price of a normal good will cause quantity demanded to increase. If an own price decrease causes a decline in quantity demanded (known as Giffen’s paradox), the good must be inferior.

14 さらに読み込む

Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.   Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .   After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

20 さらに読み込む

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . Derive the …rm’s short-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. (b) In the long run, the …rm can vary both capital and labor. Derive the …rm’s

3 さらに読み込む

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then it must be unique whenever the consumer’s preference relation is convex.

2 さらに読み込む

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

安田予想で未受賞候補者たち   Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ!   Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうか?   Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい…   Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう…

21 さらに読み込む

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.   Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

49 さらに読み込む

Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

20 さらに読み込む

Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

17 さらに読み込む

Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

23 さらに読み込む

Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

16 さらに読み込む

Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

18 さらに読み込む

Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).   Ber[r]

16 さらに読み込む

Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)    (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!   Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

27 さらに読み込む

EX3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

17 さらに読み込む

Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

20 さらに読み込む

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash equilibrium. (c) If there are two Nash equilibria in pure-strategy, they can ALWAYS be Pareto

3 さらに読み込む

PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r]

2 さらに読み込む

Final14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

    5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points)  There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one  bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore 1/3.  Each  individual  knows  only  her  own  bill,  and  is  simultaneously  given  the  option  of  exchanging her bill for the other individual’s bill. The bills will be exchanged if and only  if  both  individuals  wish  to  do  so;  otherwise  no  exchange  occurs.  That  is,  each  individuals can choose either exchange (E) or not (N), and exchange occurs only when  both  choose  E.  We  assume  that  individuals’  objective  is  to  maximize  their  expected  monetary payoff ($). 
さらに見せる

3 さらに読み込む

Show all 10000 documents...