# トップPDF Lec1 8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Lec1 8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choices. We view ...

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### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**1**) Write the payoff functions π

**1**and π 2 (as a function of p

**1**and p 2 ). (2) Derive the best response function for each player. (3) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. (4) Derive ...

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### en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**1**, x 2 ) and v(x

**1**, x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then

**s**(x

**1**, x 2 ) := u(x

**1**, x 2 ) + v(x

**1**, x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x

**1**, x 2 ) and ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**の**プレイヤーがとること

**の**できる行動 【利得】 起こり得る行動

**の**組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲーム

**の**解（予測）はどうやって与えられる？ A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ...

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### Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**Identity | もっとロア

**の**恒等式 Roy’

**s**identity says that the consumer’

**s**Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...

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### PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**1**. Suppose preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility ...

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### Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ...

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### Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**1**units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x

**1**+ 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...

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### Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**1**) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...

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### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’

**s**Method You have two …nal exams ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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