トップPDF Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... EV uses the current prices as the base and asks what income change at the current prices would be equivalent to the proposed change in terms of its impact on utility. CV uses the new prices as the base and asks what ...
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Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ...
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Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... homeowners, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose how many hours to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn (denoted by l 1 and l 2 ...that 1’s payoff is expressed ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 + x 2 with ; > 0, then % satis…es the above three ...is 1) Additive and Strictly monotone but not Continuous, and 2) Strictly monotone and Continuous but not ...
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Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ...
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en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...
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PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ここで Apple ’sの行動は Apple が Google の行動をどう予想 するかによって決まる Google の最適な戦略は Google が「 Apple が Google の行動をどう予想するか」をどう予想するかによって 決まる ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...
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Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロアの恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...
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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 6. Cost Minimization Problem A …m can rent capital (K) at a rental price r and hire labor (L) at a wage w. To produce anything at all requires one unit of capital, i.e. r 1 = r is a …xed cost; this is sunk in the ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) When an indirect utility function takes Gorman form, its original utility func- tion must be quasi-linear. (d) A firm’s cost function is homogeneous of degree 0 in the input price vectors. (e) If an allocation ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Exchange Economy (12 points) Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, 1 and 2, have the ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...
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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...
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