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... If there are ties in the payoffs, then there may be more than one such equilib­ rium and there may be more than one sequentially rational strategy profile. SUBGAME PERFECTION The concept of backward induction can be ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Strategy and Outcome
 Strategy in dynamic game = Complete plan of actions  What each player will do in every possible chance of move.  Even if some actions will not be taken in the actual play, players ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... in game theory, which will provide you with mathematical tools for analyzing strategic situations ‐ your optimal decision depends on what other people will ...in game theory such as Nash equilibrium, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？ Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたのは好材料？ Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？ 清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) ...the game is played infinitely many times: payoff of each player is discounted sum of each period payoff with some discount factor δ ∈ (0, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.  Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Show that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in this game. (b) Is there any strictly dominated strategy? If yes, describe which strategy is dominated by which strategy. If no, briefly explain the reason. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... C) Now suppose that the rule of the game is modified as follows. If exchange occurs, each individual receives 3 times as much amount as the bill she will have. For example, if individual 1 receives $5 and 2  ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) Now suppose there are n(> 2) individuals. Then, can we find a competitive equilibrium? (How) Does your answer depend on n? 4. Question 4 (8 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1. Rationality  Players can reach Nash equilibrium only by rational reasoning in some games, e.g., Prisoners’ dilemma.  However, rationality alone is often insufficient to lead to NE. (see Battle of the sexes, Chicken ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照