[PDF] Top 20 Comments on the Midterm Exam 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Standard deviation: 12.44 Comments:  The average performance is very good. I think most of you fully understand the basic concepts in the lecture. Those of you receive 40 or lower might better study much ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) Now suppose there are n(> 2) individuals. Then, can we find a competitive equilibrium? (How) Does your answer depend on n? 4. Question 4 (8 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... be the prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer the following ...Sketch the isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is the combination of inputs that achieves a given ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... C) Now suppose that the rule of the game is modified as follows. If exchange occurs, each individual receives 3 times as much amount as the bill she will have. For example, if individual 1 receives  ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Show that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in this game. (b) Is there any strictly dominated strategy? If yes, describe which strategy is dominated by which strategy. If no, briefly explain the reason. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... of the past history of the play.  In the second to the last period ( t = T-1 ), no firm has an incentive to collude since the future play will be a price war no matter how each firm ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... General Formulation of PD
 The larger the payoff, the better the corresponding result.  Desirability of outcomes for each player:  g > c > d > l, that is, ( D , C ) > ( C , C ) > ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
 (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Choose a subway station in Tokyo and write down its name.  You will win if you can choose the most popular answer.  Most of the students are expected to write “xxx”.  Like this experiment, there may ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Simple 2-2 Games (18 points, take your time) For the 2-2 games X, Y, and Z below, answer the following questions: i. Explain whether there exists a dominant strategy. ii. Find (all) pure-strategy Nash ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider the two-period repeated game in which the above stage game will be played ...that the payoff for each player is simply the sum of the payoffs in the stage ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... a) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions, i.e., A, B for P1 and D, E for P2, respectively. c) Is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 4. Incomplete Information (16 points, think carefully) There are four different bills, $1, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill  ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Strategy and Outcome
 Strategy in dynamic game = Complete plan of actions  What each player will do in every possible chance of move.  Even if some actions will not be taken in the actual play, players ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ... 完全なドキュメントを参照