# トップPDF Comments on the Midterm Exam 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Comments on the Midterm Exam 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**basic concepts in

**the**lecture. Those of you receive 40 or lower might better study much ...

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### PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**on**n? 4. Question 4 (8 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann ...

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### Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**prices for inputs x 1 and x 2 respectively. Then, answer

**the**following ...Sketch

**the**isoquant for this technology. Hint: Isoquant is

**the**combination of inputs that achieves a given ...

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### Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**rule of

**the**game is modified as follows. If exchange occurs, each individual receives 3 times as much amount as

**the**bill she will have. For example, if individual 1 receives ...

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### Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**reason. ...

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### Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**past history of

**the**play. In

**the**second to

**the**last period ( t = T-1 ), no firm has an incentive to collude since

**the**future play will be a price war no matter how each firm ...

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### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**payoff,

**the**better

**the**corresponding result. Desirability of outcomes for each player: g > c > d > l, that is, ( D , C ) > ( C , C ) > ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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### Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**most popular answer. Most of

**the**students are expected to write “xxx”. Like this experiment, there may ...

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### Midterm13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**2-2 games X, Y, and Z below, answer

**the**following questions: i. Explain whether there exists a dominant strategy. ii. Find (all) pure-strategy Nash ...

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### Final11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**two-period repeated game in which

**the**above stage game will be played ...that

**the**payoff for each player is simply

**the**sum of

**the**payoffs in

**the**stage ...

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### Midterm12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just

**the**first two actions, i.e., A, B for P1 and D, E for P2, respectively. c) Is ...

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### Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**the**actual play, players ...

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### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### EX3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**on**November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ...

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