However, our mission to encourage the safe and secure utilization of nuclear energy has yet to be completed. ¾ Towards a more balanced approach to the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy by strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation.
Introduction
Growing Needs of Nuclear Energy
Expectations for nuclear power to fill the gap between energy demand and supply have become very high. We believe that the global promotion of nuclear power would provide an effective way to address these challenges.
Deepening Concerns over Nuclear Threats
Given the energy security and environmental challenges we face, the role of nuclear energy will become all the more important. Sensitive nuclear technology could be acquired in the name of the “inalienable right” to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Agenda for a Sustainable Nuclear Future
We must pay utmost attention to the reduction, safe storage and disposal of nuclear waste. To contain the shadowy side, we must strengthen global non-proliferation efforts so that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not exploited to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. As the use of nuclear energy spreads, the risks and threats arising from such activities will increase.
A peaceful nuclear program could be used to build up materials and capabilities for military purposes, disguising such intentions from withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All people should remember that the total abolition of nuclear weapons is the goal of every civilization. Towards a more balanced approach to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy by strengthening global nuclear energy.
Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy by Strengthening Global Nuclear
Developing Appropriate Social and Policy Infrastructure for Nuclear Energy
Establish the ‘Three S’ as a universal guiding principle for safe and secure development of nuclear energy
Safeguards in the context of the 'Three S' refer to any measures designed to prevent nuclear proliferation. With such an integrated and, where necessary, strengthened and streamlined framework for the 'Three S', the prerequisites for the introduction and operation of nuclear energy activities will become clearer, and the transparency and sustainability of. Three S' concept is not intended to create a gap between nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Instead, it means that international cooperation in the introduction of nuclear energy must be accompanied by cooperation in building a firm regulatory/management infrastructure for nuclear power programs based on the 'Three S' concept in countries introducing nuclear energy programs.
In other words, countries providing nuclear cooperation must be aware of the essential importance of providing support for capacity building in the 'three S' for the long-term reduction of the various risks associated with nuclear energy. It would also be useful to invite the nuclear industry to the 'three S' discussions, as they have the expertise and in many cases are primarily responsible for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. The 'Three S' should not be seen as the unilateral imposition of strict regulations or barriers on developing countries by industrialized countries.
Provide appropriate international financial assistance to nuclear energy programs and projects in
Rather, we consider it essential that the international community (especially exporting countries and relevant institutions) provide opportunities for dialogue and necessary assistance (both technical and financial) to states that have nuclear power plants or that have plans to introduce nuclear power programs so that they can meet the requirements of the 'Three S' are met. For the safe and peaceful promotion of nuclear energy, the establishment of mechanisms for international cooperation can also be effective, especially in the field of technical assistance for the development of human resources and the sharing of best practices in safety, security and non-proliferation activities. Other existing financial mechanisms such as World Bank loans and OECD export credit guidelines, which currently discriminate against nuclear projects, should be made available for nuclear power projects.
It may also be worthwhile to explore linking financial support through the mechanisms mentioned above to compliance with the 'Three S' directives, as this would contribute to increasing the safety and security of nuclear activities and to the non-proliferation.
Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with global warming and develop appropriate schemes
Toward Strengthening the ‘Three S’
Ensure nuclear safety as a top priority for introducing nuclear programs and promote international
Address liability properly both in domestic regulatory frameworks and in international cooperation
Strengthen international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and address nuclear security concerns
The Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical) was launched at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 to address the growing threat of terrorists acquiring such weapons and materials. offer. The G8 and their partners have implemented specific projects in Russia, including securing nuclear material, dismantling nuclear submarines and destroying chemical weapons. Because the prospect of related materials, equipment and technology falling into the wrong hands is a global danger, the activities under this Partnership must be expanded worldwide in scope and membership.
In this sense, the G8 global partnership could be used as a channel to provide the necessary financial and technical cooperation to countries that urgently need measures to strengthen the security and physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials and to implement the UNSCR 1540 and subsequent resolutions. We should also note the importance of sharing information, expertise and best practices between like-minded countries on nuclear security and physical protection as well as the protection of sensitive information. In particular, efforts to facilitate information sharing and mutual cooperation between nuclear operators and facilities should be promoted at global level.
Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export control regime
Explore ways to utilize assurance of fuel supply and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle in
In the meantime, we encourage the NSG and other international forums to continue discussing means to ensure effective oversight and intrusive access to transferred technology and material. International interdependence is already a fact of life in nuclear fuel supply and will become increasingly important as most 'national' fuel cycle programs have international elements. First, such multilateral fuel cycle arrangements should not distort existing, relatively well-functioning market mechanisms for fuel procurement.
There is also concern that such mechanisms may regulate the status of supplier (or 'nuclear-have') and consumer (or 'non-nuclear') states – in other words, they may create another form of discrimination in the international nuclear order. . It is therefore necessary for such mechanisms to be flexible enough to accept different types of contributions from member states, depending on what they can offer the mechanisms. Consideration should also be given to other functions in the front-end process, such as fuel mining, conversion and fabrication, when such mechanisms are envisaged.
Address concerns over the back end of the fuel cycle
Strengthen implementation and enforcement mechanisms for non-proliferation
Moreover, resolving these two cases and implementing measures to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of the non-proliferation regime must be done together to prevent other countries from following suit. Policy measures such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Non-Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are important elements of the international non-proliferation regime. The conditionality of withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be properly addressed at the NPT Review Conference and the UN Security Council.
Enforcement in the event of non-compliance is necessary to maintain the credibility and reliability of the international non-proliferation regime. In this sense, the link between the IAEA and the UN Security Council, as prescribed in the IAEA Statute, should be strengthened in a way that strengthens the capacity to enforce non-proliferation rules. The international community's demonstration that it is united and will not tolerate non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements through the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions and the imposition of sanctions authorized by the enforcement of those resolutions would strengthen non-proliferation and deter potential proliferators.
Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing more proliferation-resistant technology, sophisticated
Reducing Nuclear Threats
To make the world safer from nuclear threats, all types of security threats arising from nuclear activities should be treated equally. A balanced approach to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, strengthening safety, security and security measures to strengthen non-proliferation and suppression of nuclear terrorism and reduction of existing nuclear weapons is another important element in the pursuit of a world free from nuclear threats, which would enable us to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy. We recognize that the "grand bargain" among the three pillars of the NPT - non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament - remains a vital part of the international non-proliferation regime, and each component should be properly addressed.
In particular, it must be remembered that the political commitment of nuclear weapon states to further efforts in nuclear disarmament, which was reiterated at the 1995 NPT Review and Enlargement Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, must be faithfully pursued. In order to further expand and strengthen the global non-proliferation campaign, disarmament efforts by all nuclear-armed states are indispensable. In this context, we need to review the importance of addressing and adopting measures for nuclear disarmament.
Reemphasize nuclear disarmament and reaffirm the total elimination of nuclear weapons as an important
They should all commit to further efforts towards nuclear disarmament and take concrete steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The 'Gang of Four' op-eds are also indicative of the trend towards diminishing the strategic and political roles of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we demand that further concrete steps be taken by the United States and Russia to achieve security with less reliance on nuclear weapons.
Such efforts by the United States and Russia would lead other countries to make their own commitments to reduce nuclear weapons. Other nuclear-armed states should now take steps toward the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that such progress would serve to create international conditions for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation conducive to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Address security incentives for nuclear proliferation
In order to further encourage nuclear weapon states to engage in nuclear disarmament, it is also worth considering the establishment of an international mechanism to continuously monitor and verify the dismantling of nuclear arsenals. For building trust and confidence between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, approaches involving non-nuclear weapon states in the verification process may well be pursued. We also recognize that an unstable regional security order may motivate states to pursue the nuclear option.
Measures to reduce strategic incentives (or regional security concerns) that could push states to use nuclear energy should be considered and implemented alongside measures to develop institutional non-proliferation mechanisms. Security guarantees through a multilateral framework that includes both non-proliferation/disarmament and non-aggression commitments can be negotiated as a confidence-building measure. Security guarantees could be useful in reducing incentives to possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent and in shaping relationships between regional rivals by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in conflict situations.
Achieve early entry-into-force of the CTBT and start negotiations on an FMCT
Conclusion: Toward a more sustainable non-proliferation regime
When discussing the sustainability of a world without the threat of nuclear weapons, we must also consider the sustainability of the global non-proliferation regime and the universal norms that the regime has provided. Promoting nuclear disarmament would strengthen the norms of the international non-proliferation regime and thus encourage countries to engage in global non-proliferation efforts. We also recognize that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin.
Takahiko Ito is currently a consultant to Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., as well as a commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. He is the executive director of the Japan Energy and Resources Association and the vice president of the Japan Electric Heating Association. Shinichi Ogawa is the Director of the Research Division of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Ministry of Defense.
