• 検索結果がありません。

英語 IA 1A5 (=E1R86), 1L1 (=E1R05), 英語 IIA E2R40

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2023

シェア "英語 IA 1A5 (=E1R86), 1L1 (=E1R05), 英語 IIA E2R40"

Copied!
35
0
0

読み込み中.... (全文を見る)

全文

(1)

2011-07-14

英語

IA 1A5 (=E1R86), 1L1 (=E1R05) ,

英語

IIA E2R40 , 2011

9

(

10

)

黒田 (非常勤) 出口雅也 (非常勤) の代理

(2)

講義資料の

Web

ページ

URL

http://clsl.hi.h.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~kkuroda/lectures.html

The Feynman Lectures on Physics

の音源ファイルや授業で 使ったスライドはこのページから入手可能

予習や復習に使って下さい

解答もこのページから入手可能

京都工芸繊維大学で使っている教材(過去の分)もあるの で,自習に使って良いです

(3)

期末ボーナス試験

7/28 () に試験をします

この試験は任意参加のボーナス試験です

授業でやったのと同じ課題を行なう

ハズレがアタリに

アタリはアタリのまま

出題範囲

L1, L2, L3 (繰り返し2)

L6 (繰り返しなし)

(4)

任意参加ではない方々

1A5

脇田 健史

都築 雅美, 弓場汐莉, 夏目知明, 藤本 俊平, 佐藤 , 本田 貴大

2R

大塚 直通, 財前 雄太, 乗竹 剛志, 順貴, 大野 , 長谷川 栄貴, 小野原 龍一, 松井 孝憲, 三野 春樹, 藤本 瞭一, 福地 崇洋, 拓矢

栗原 拓也, 大月 亮太

1L1

窪田 かすみ, 祐太,, 松元 大周, 川崎 眞理子

岡田 眞太郎, 藤貫 , 宮本 貴史

(5)

評価方法

得点獲得率 G で評価しています

G = (S1 + S2 + + Sn)/ n

Si i回目の試験の得点 (標準化されたもの)

n の最大値は 9 (今ところ n = 7)

面倒な点

受けなかった試験を対象外にする (通常の意味での平均点)

受けなかった試験の得点 = 0 とする (上の場合)

の二つで結果が違う

(6)

8/4

の補講は見送り

大学から

2

回補講してもらえないですか

?

と言われ,

アンケート調査をしました

結果は

1A5, 2R, 1L1

の全クラスで見送りです

おめでとう

(7)

本日の予定

前半30

1. L7の聞き取り課題の結果の報告

2. 正解の解説

休憩5

後半45

聞き取り訓練 L8

Temple Grandin: The world needs all kinds of mindsの前半

自閉症 (autism), 創造性 (creativity), 脳科学 (brain science)

(8)

L7

の結果

(Laurie Santos: A monkey

marker as irrational as ours , Part 2)

(9)

L7

の得点分布

1A5, 2R, 1L1

参加者: 67

平均: 68.31; 標準偏差: 12.23

最高: 91.00; 最低: 36.00

得点グループ

40点が中心のグループ

55点が中心のグループ

75点が中心のグループ

(10)

L7

の得点分布

1A5

受講者数: 19

平均: 33.53/n [67.05]

標準偏差: 8.17/n [16.33]

最高: 44.50/n [91.00]

最低: 18.00/n [36.00]

n = 50

得点グループ

40点中心, 60点中心, 70点中心

85点中心

(11)

L7

の得点分布

2R

受講者数: 15

平均: 31.87/n [63.73]

標準偏差: 6.29/n [12.57]

最高: 43.00/n [86.00]

最低: 20.00/n [40.00]

n = 50

得点グループ

70点中心?

すごく平たい分布

(12)

L7

の得点分布

1L1

受講者数: 33

平均: 35.56/n [71.12]

標準偏差: 4.20/n [ 8.40]

最高: 44.50/n [89.00]

最低: 27.00/n [54.00]

n = 50

得点グループ

80点中心, 65点中心

(13)

得点の変遷

(L7

まで

)

(14)

L7

の正解率分布

1A5, 2R, 1L1

参加者: 67

平均値: 0.80

最高値: 0.94; 最低値: 0.63

標準偏差: 0.06

正答率のグループ

0.8後半が中心

(15)

L7

の正答率分布

1A5

参加者: 19

平均: 0.86; 標準偏差: 0.05

最高: 0.94; 最低: 0.77

正答率のグループ

0.9が中心

(16)

L7

の正答率分布

2R

参加者: 15

平均: 0.86; 標準偏差: 0.05

最高: 0.94; 最低: 0.79

正答率のグループ

0.9が中心

(17)

L7

の正答率分布

1L1

参加者: 33

平均: 0.85; 標準偏差: 0.05

最高: 0.95; 最低: 0.76

正答率のグループ

0.85が中心

(18)

正答率の変遷

(L7

まで

)

(19)

L7

の解答

(Laurie Santos: A monkey

market as irrational as ours )

(20)

誤りの傾向

1. earn => learn, turn

2. go

3. comes => counts

4. make => maked

5. flip => full, foot, food

6. lose => have, tell, keep

7. reach => get, go

8. having => hurry, have

9. choose => use, you

10. varies => very, barely

11. seems => is, see, seen, sense, since, scene

12. relative =>

raddle

13. options

14. last

15. play

16. at => out

17. between

18. experiencing =>

experience

19. both

20. extra => actura

21. bonus

22. risk => lisk

23. guys

24. psyched => site, sight

25. monkeys =>

monkey

26. irrational = rush (ed), around

27. treat => three, nature, naturally

28. some

29. systematically

30. thought

31. dumb => down, done

32. investors

33. wanted => want

34. tweak

35. evolutionary =>

additionary

36. capuchin => put, pu

37. old

38. strategies =>

strategy

39. shut => shout, shot, shaut, show

40. built

41. your

42. hard

43. supposed =>

possible, post(ing)

44. smart

45. flew => full, fool

46. wearing => in, really

47. means

48. said => set

49. recognize

50. we => review, you

(21)

01/14

Sounds great, but you get one more choice to [1. earn] a little bit more money. And here’s your choice: you can either be risky, in which case I’m going to flip one of these monkey tokens. If it comes up heads, you’re going to get a thousand dollars more. If it comes up tails, you get nothing. So it’s a chance to get more, but it’s pretty risky. Your other option is a bit safe. Your just

going to get some money for sure. I’m just going to give you 500 bucks. You can stick it in your wallet and use it immediately. So see what your intuition is here. Most people actually [2. go]

with the play-it-safe option. Most people say, why should I be risky when I can get 1,500 dollars for sure? This seems like a good bet. I’m going to go with that. You might say, eh, that’s not really irrational. People are a little risk-averse. So what?

(22)

02/14

Well, the “so what?” [3. comes] when start thinking about the same problem set up just a little bit differently. So now imagine that I give each and every one of you 2,000 dollars— 20 crisp hundred dollar bills. Now you can buy double to stuff you were going to get before. Think about how you’d feel sticking it in

your wallet. And now imagine that I have you [4. make] another choice But this time, it’s a little bit worse. Now, you’re going to be deciding how you’re going to lose money, but you’re going to get the same choice. You can either take a risky loss— so I’ll [5.

flip] a coin. If it comes up heads, you’re going to actually lose a lot. If it comes up tails, you [6. lose] nothing, you’re fine, get to keep the whole thing— or you could play it safe, which means you have to [7. reach] back into your wallet and give me five of those $100 bills, for certain.

(23)

03/14

And I’m seeing a lot of furrowed brows out there. So maybe you’re [8. having] the same intuitions as the

subjects that were actually tested in this, which is when presented with these options, people don’t [9. choose] to play it safe. They actually tend to go a little risky. The

reason this is irrational is that we’ve given people in both situations the same choice. It’s a 50/50 shot of a

thousand or 2,000, or just 1,500 dollars with certainty.

But people’s intuitions about how much risk to take [10.

varies] depending on where they started with.

(24)

04/14

So what’s going on? Well, it turns out that this [11. seems]

to be the result of at least two biases that we have at the psychological level. One is that we have a really hard time thinking in absolute terms. You really have to do work to figure out, well, one option’s a thousand, 2,000; one is

1,500. Instead, we find it very easy to think in very [12.

relative] terms as options change from one time to another.

So we think of things as, “Oh, I’m going to get more,” or

“Oh, I’m going to get less.” This is all well and good, except that changes in different directions actually affect whether or not we think [13. options] are good or not. And this

leads to the second bias, which economists have called loss

aversion.

(25)

05/14

The idea is that we really hate it when things go into the red.

We really hate it when we have to lose out on some money.

And this means that sometimes we’ll actually switch our preferences to avoid this. What you saw in that [14. last]

scenario is that subjects get risky because they want the small shot that there won’t be any loss. That means when we’re in a risk mindset —excuse me, when we’re in a loss mindset, we actually become more risky, which can actually be really

worrying. These kinds of things [15. play] out in lots of bad ways in humans. They’re why stock investors hold onto losing stocks longer —because they’re evaluating them in relative

terms. They’re why people in the housing market refused to sell their house —because they don’t want to sell [16. at] a loss.

(26)

06/14

The question we were interested in is whether the monkeys show the same biases. If we set up those same scenarios in our little

monkey market, would they do the same thing as people? And so this is what we did, we gave the monkeys choices [17. between]

guys who were safe —they did the same thing every time —or guys who were risky —they did things differently half the time.

And then we gave them options that were bonuses —like you guys did in the first scenario —so they actually have a chance

more, or pieces where they were [18. experiencing] losses —they actually thought they were going to get more than they really got.

And so this is what this looks like. We introduced the monkeys to two new monkey salesmen. The guy on the left and right [19.

both] start with one piece of grape, so it looks pretty good.

(27)

07/14

But they’re going to give the monkeys bonuses. The guy on the left is a safe bonus. All the time, he adds one, to give the monkeys two. The guy on the right is actually a risky bonus.

Sometimes the monkeys get no bonus —so this is a bonus of zero. Sometimes the monkeys get two [20. extra]. For a big

bonus, now they get three. But this is the same choice you guys just faced. Do the monkeys actually want to play it safe and

then go with the guy who’s going to do the same thing on every trial, or do they want to be risky and try to get a risky, but big, bonus, but risk the possibility of getting no [21.

bonus]. People here played it safe. [It] turns out, the monkeys play it safe too. Qualitatively and quantitatively, they choose exactly the same way as people, when tested in the same thing.

(28)

08/14

You might say, well, maybe the monkeys just don’t like [22.

risk]. Maybe we should see how they do with losses. And so we ran a second version of this. Now, the monkeys meet two guys who aren’t giving them bonuses; they’re actually giving them less than they expect. So they look like they’re starting out with a big amount. These are three grapes; the monkey’s really

psyched for this. But now they learn these [23. guys] are going to give them less than they expect. They guy on the left is a

safe loss. Every single time, he’s going to take one of these

away and give the monkeys just two. the guy on the right is the risky loss. Sometimes he gives no loss, so the monkeys are

really [24. psyched], but sometimes he actually gives a big loss, taking away two to give the monkeys only one.

(29)

9/14

And so what do the [25. monkeys] do? Again, same choice; they can play it safe for always getting two grapes every single time, or they can take a risky bet and choose between one and three.

The remarkable thing to us is that, when you give monkeys this choice, they do the same [26. irrational] thing that people do.

They actually become more risky depending on how the

experimenters started. This is crazy because it suggests that the monkeys too are evaluating things in relative terms and actually treating losses differently than they [27. treat] gains.

So what does all of this mean? Well, what we’ve shown is that, first of all, we can actually give the monkeys a financial

currency, and they do very similar things with it.

(30)

10/14

They do [28. some] of the smart things we do, some of the kind of not so nice things we do, like steal it and so on. But they also do some of the irrational things we do. They [29.

systematically] get things wrong and in the same ways that we

do. This is the first take-home message of the Talk, which is that if you saw the beginning of this and you [30. thought], oh, I’m totally going to go home and hire a capuchin monkey financial adviser. They’re way cuter than the one at ... you know— Don’t do that; they’re probably going to be just as [31. dumb] as the human one you already have.

So, you know, a little bad —Sorry, sorry, sorry. A little bad for

monkey [32. investors].

(31)

11/14

But of course, you know, the reason you’re laughing is bad for

humans too. Because we’ve answered the question we started out with. We [33. wanted] to know where these kinds of errors came from. And we started with the hope that maybe we can sort of tweak our financial institutions, [34. tweak] our technologies to make ourselves better. But what we’ve learn is that these biases might be a deeper part of us than that. In fact, they might be due to the very nature of our [35. evolutionary] history. You know, maybe it’s not just humans at the right side of this chain that’s dunce-y. Maybe it’s sort of dunce-y all the way back. And this, if we believe the [36. capuchin] monkey results, means that these dunce-y strategies might be 35 million years old. That’s a long time for a strategy to potentially get changed around — really, really [37. old].

(32)

12/14

What do we know about other old [38. strategies] like this? Well, one thing we know is that they tend to be really hard to

overcome. You know, think of our evolutionary predilection for eating sweet things, fatty things like cheesecake. You can’t just [39. shut] that off. You can’t just look at the dessert cart as say,

“No, no, no. That looks disgusting to me.” We’re just [40. built]

differently. We’re going to perceive it as a good thing to go after.

My guess is that the same thing is going to be true when humans are perceiving different financial decisions. When you’re

watching [41. your] stocks plummet into the red, when you’re watching your house price go down, you’re not going to be able to see that in anything but old evolutionary terms. This means that the biases that lead investors to do badly, that lead to the foreclosure crisis are going to be really [42. hard] to overcome.

(33)

13/14

So that’s the bad news. The question is: is there any good news?

I’m [43. supposed] to be up here telling you the good news.

Well, the good news, I think, is what I started with at the

beginning of the talk, which is that humans are not only smart;

we’re really inspirationally [44. smart] to the rest of the animals in the biological kingdom. We’re so good at overcoming our

biological limitations— you know, I [45. flew] over here in an airplane. I didn’t have to try to flap my wings. I’m [46. wearing]

contact lenses now so that I can see all of you. I don’t have to rely on my own near-sightedness. We actually have all of these cases where we overcome our biological limitations through technology and other [47. means], seemingly pretty easily. But we have to recognize that we have those limitations.

(34)

14/14

And here’s the rub. It was Camus who once [48. said]

that, “Man is the only species who refuses to be what he really is.” But the irony is that it might only be in

recognizing our limitations that we can really actually

overcome them. The hope is that you all will think about your limitations, not necessarily as unovercomable, but to [49. recognize] them, accept them and then use the

world of design to actually figure them out. That might be the only way that [50. we] will really be able to

achieve our own human potential and really be the noble species we hope to all be.

Thank you. (Applause)

(35)

TED

を使った聞き取り

L8

Temple Grandin: The world needs all kinds of minds

の後半

全体の長さ: 16

今日の課題の長さ: 9分まで

穴埋め方式

長い目のユニットごとに2回反復

ユニットの間に答えを書く時間を作ります

参照

関連したドキュメント

I think I want to keep my health the best in this year, also, and I want to improve my English skill too.. An d I want to find another expertise, such as management or economic or

Scale Description ID Items Computer Competence CC How is the student engaged with digitally stored information and how do they relate to the information presented?. CC1 I