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中国家計における消費・貯蓄行動と人的資本の役割

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中国家計における消費・貯蓄行動と人的資本の役割

著者

蔡 桂全

学位授与機関

Tohoku University

学位授与番号

11301

(2)
(3)
(4)

1 2 21 COE COE

(5)

1984 20 1992 30 26

2018 29.6

(Modigliani and Cao 2004,Horioka and Wan 2007)

De Nardi 2004, De Nardi et al.2010, 2017, Niimi and Horioka 2018,

Murata 2019

2012 Yin(2014) 2012

Yin(2014)

(6)

90%

(Laibson,Repetto,and Tobacaman 1998, Angeletos et al. 2001,Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2019)

401K

1 2

(7)

2 1 2 3 1 2 ( 2019) ( 2007, 2013, 2015, 2015 3 (2007) 1949 2014 3 3

(8)

1 2013 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2012 2013 (1) (2) 30 40 50

(9)

(3) 3 (2007) 1949 2014 (1) (2) (3)

(10)

... I ... III 1 1. ... 1 2. ... 2 3. ... 6 4. ... 7 5. ... 7 5.1 ... 7 5.2 ... 8 5.3 ... 8 5.4 ... 8 6. ... 10 7. ... 11 8. ... 12 8.1 ... 13 8.2 ... 14 9. ... 15 10. ... 17 ... 20 2 : 1. ... 28 2. ... 34 3. ... 36

(11)

4. ... 40 5. ... 41 5.1 ( ) ... 41 5.2 ... 42 6. ... 43 6.1 ... 43 6.2 ... 45 7. ... 46 8. ... 49 8.1 ... 49 8.2 ... 51 9. ... 52 ... 54 ... 62 3 : 1. ... 64 2. ... 68 3. ... 71 3.1 ... 71 3.2 ... 72 3.3 1977 ... 73 4. ... 74 5. ... 77 6. ... 80 7. ... 83 ... 86 ... 94

(12)
(13)

1

JEL Classification Codes:D14; D15; E21

(Ameriks et al.2015, 2017, Niimi and Horioka

2018, Murata 2019)

(14)

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8.1 8.2 9 10 OECD 65 2000 7% 2018 12%

(15)

De Nardi et al.2010, 2017, Niimi and Horiok

a 2018, Murata 2019, 2019, 20201

Kotlikoff and Summers 1981 Historical U.S. Data

Hurd 1987 Health and Reti

rement Survey

Dynan et al(2002) 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance

De Nardi et al. (2010) Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old data

Ameriks et al.(2015) Strategic Survey Questions

Horioka and Niimi(2017) Murata(2019)

( 1996, 2001,

(16)

80 (2017) 2013 2015 1 1.22 (0.19 ) 2% 29% Nii mi and Horioka(2018) Murata(2019) Murata(2019) 6%

Dobrescu(2015), Horioka and Ventura(2017)

(Kraay 2000,Meng 2003,Modigl iani and Cao 2004,Horioka and Wan 2007,Wei and Zhang 2009)

(17)

oka and Wan 2007, Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark 2015) 2012 Yin(2014) 2012 2000 2006 20 10 (2012) Yin(2014) (2017), Murata (2019) 2013

(18)

2003 2013 2013 2003 2007 21 COE 2008 COE 3 20 69 2 2013 2013 3 6 230 1380 818( 59%) 60 154 4 2009 2013 5 2012 2013 2013

(19)

(2017,2018) Murata(20 19) Murata(2019) !" = $0+ $1&'()'*+,)--. + $2/0'12)+345,)--. + 67 + 8 , 1 SR BequestDummy PrecautionDummy $$ > 0 X

(20)

5 8% 2013 AQ-21-1 AQ-21-7 1 0 6 Murata(2019) 1 (2016)

(21)

AQ-21-10 1 0 2 0 10 90% 10 7 1 5( )

(22)

1 64 88% 1.5 0.6 5 1 85% 4 20 9% 2.4 45% 14% 12% 78% 8%

(De Nardi et al.

2010) 2

69% 31%

46% 54%

(23)

4 4 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.22 8 5 (1) (1) 10 0.027 (2) (3) 1 0.095 (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) 2 Murata(2019) Murata(2019) Mu

(24)

rata(2019)

3

3 9

(Dynan,Skinner,and Zeldes 2002,Murata 2019)

(Xie and Zhu 2009, Jiang,Li,and Fledman 2015) 3

Horioka 2002

49 23

14 15

16

(25)

Horioka(2002) 3 1 Barro(1974) Becker(1974,2009) 2 (Chu 1991) 3

(26)

Bernheim et al. (1 985) 3 Murata (2019) Murata(2019) !" = $0+ $1&'()'*+,)--. + $2/0'12)+345,)--. + $3&'()'*+,)--. ∗ "2+344<*45+41ℎ3>? + $4"2+344<*45+41ℎ3>? + $5&'()'*+,)--. ∗ /0'12)+345,)--. + 67 + 8 (2) (&'()'*+,)--. ∗ "2+344<*45+41ℎ3>?) 1 $3+ $4

(27)

(&'()'*+,)--. ∗ /0'12)+345,)--.) 6 $1+ $5 7 (2) (1) Murata(2019) (2) (1) 0.404 1% 1 $3+ $4 -0.275 1%

(28)

0.129(0.404-0.275 ) (2) -0.279 $1+ $6 Horioka(2014) Jiang et al 2015

(Zhan and Montgomery 2003,Cong and Silverstein 2012) 13

10

(29)

(2) 8 1 2 (2-1) 2-2 55

(30)

Murata(2019)

Murata(2019)

(31)
(32)
(33)

60 2013 154 0.080 0.383 -1.256 0.905 154 0.448 0.499 0 1 () 154 0.251 0.402 0 1 1 154 0.785 0.411 0 1 1 154 0.383 0.488 0 1 154 64.162 2.971 60.083 74.833 0 154 41.255 3.909 36.100 56.000 154 0.455 0.500 0 1 154 0.883 0.322 0 1 154 0.260 0.440 0 1 154 2.383 0.909 1 5 154 0.851 0.358 0 1 154 3.974 2.784 0 10 154 0.136 0.344 0 1 / 154 0.117 0.322 0 1 () 154 0.603 0.415 0 1 154 1.578 0.739 1 4 154 0.188 0.392 0 1 154 13.813 1.014 11.775 18.460 154 11.089 0.569 9.903 13.305

(34)

2 2013 ( 69% 53% 51% 46% 85 31% 47% 49% 54% 69 39 43 35 37 154 68% 38% 51% 64% 85 32% 62% 49% 36% 69 40 37 41 36 154 (

(35)

3 2013 ) ) ) ) ( 26% 19% 23% 19% 33( 74% 81% 77% 81% 121( ( 39( 43( 35( 37( 154( ) ) ) ) ( 27% 30% 7% 22% 33( 73% 70% 93% 78% 121( ( 40( 37( 41( 36( 154( ) )

(36)

4 2013 1 0.152 1 0.109 0.088 1 -0.092 -0.087 -0.22 1

(37)

5 (1) Murta(2019) -0.045 (0.096) -0.039 (0.928) -0.047 (0.091) -0.047 (0.093) -0.040 (0.091) 0.053 (0.088) 0.040 (0.847) 0.044 (0.088) 0.045 (0.088) 0.055 (0.087) 0.095*** (0.039) 0.095*** (0.038) 0.097*** (0.387) 0.106*** (0.039) -0.025 (0.093) -0.027 (0.937) -0.022 (0.947) ( -0.032 (0.061) -0.022 (0.621) (% -0.094 (0.078) -0.003 (0.318) -0.116 (0.032) -0.012 (0.032) -0.010 (0.323) -0.012 (0.032) 2 -0.065 (0.113) -0.035 (0.114) -0.034 (0116) -0.0336 (0.114) -0.032 (0.115) 1 0.162 (0.105) 0.132 (0.103) 0.132 (0.104) 0.131 (0.104) 0.140 (0.105) -0.027*** (0.010) -0.026*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.009) -0.024** (0.010) -0.021** (0.010) - )( 0 2 . * % ) ) ) ) 5 ) ) 3* 3 ) ) ) ) ) 3 * 154 154 154 154 154 0.280 0.305 0.306 0.307 0.316

(38)

6

(2)

!

1

2

!

6

(39)

7 (2)( ) ) -0.022 (0.621) -0.279* (0.151) )% -0.094 (0.078) -0.101 (0.081) ) 0.404*** (0.127) ) -0.275*** (0.077) )( 0.012 (0.161) 0.106*** (0.039) 0.095** (0.037) 0.055 (0.087) 0.089 (0.080) -0.021** (0.010) -0.019* (0.010) 3 -0.032 (0.115) -0.061 (0.098) 2 0.140 (0.105) 0.163* (0.096) 1 ) ( 1 3 . . % * * * *5 *( * 4 4 0 * * * * * 4 0.316 0.368 -154 154

(40)

2

3

:

JEL Classification Codes:D12; D15; D91 :

1

(Angeletos et al. 2001,mİmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu,and Joines 2003)

(41)

2007)

(Ainslie 1992, Frederick et al.1992, Vuchinich and Heather 2003)

(Feldstein 1985, Laibson 1996,Kang 2019) ( 2010) Diamond(1977) Feldstein(1985) 2018 60 2.4 6 1 60 2018 2 1 3

(42)

( 2011) ( ) 2 3 20% 8% 2 100 1200 100 1 12 2018 9.67 69% 3 2000 72 2017 46% “ ” 55%

(Fang and Feng 2018,

2015

2011 2009

(43)

Zhao and Mi 2019) 2016 15.3% 2019 4 77% 61 46 Angeletos et al. (2001) (Bernheim,Skiner,and Weinberg 2001) (Laibson,Repetto,and Tobacaman 1998, 2005, 2007)

(Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2019)

( 2007)

Fidelity International Ant Financial Ant Wealth

(44)

401(K) 2006 ( 2019) ( ) ( ) ( ) İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu,and Joines(2003)

(45)

2 (1) (2) 30 40 ( 60 55 50 ) 50 (3)

(46)

Laibson(1997) Angeletos et al.(2001)

Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) 2000

Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) Tilburg

(CentER) Savings Survey

(2009) 2005 2007 Kureishi and Wakabayashi(2019) Zhang(2016) 2010 Zhang 2016

(47)

(Fang and Feng 2018) Nyland,Smyth,and Zhu(2011)

Lei,Zhang,and Zhao 2014 2011 CHARLS

Liu et al.(2018)

(1)

(48)

(2007) 19% (2) ( 2005) (3) ( 2001) (4) ( 2001) (5) ( 2005) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2

(49)

" ## $

" %# &(%$, … , %%)

+,- &(%$, %&, … , %%) = 0(0)2(%$) + 0(1)2(%&) + 0(2)2(%') + ⋯ + 0(7)2(%#) , (1)

829:;<" "= %$+&*+() + ⋯ +(&*+)(, ,= #$+ /) &*++ ⋯ + /, (&*+), , (2) f(t) f(t+1)/f(t) 0(") = ># , (3) −0(#*&)10(#)0(#) = 1 − > , (4) −00(#)2(#)= −@=A (>) , (5) t > ># 2(%) 23(%) t (t+k) 42((5) 6742((5)= (1 + $)8 , (6) 2 42((5) 642((59))= 1 + $ , (7)

(50)

Lowenstein and Prelec(1992) 0(") =&*8#& , B > 0 , (8) B 0(") =&*8#& , (9) t Laibson(1997) " = 0 0(") = 1 " > 0 0(") = D># , D > 0 , (10) 0 < D < 1 2 2 " " + 1 42((5) :6 42((59))= (1 + $) # , (11)

(51)

" + 1 " + 2 42((59)) 6 42((59;)= (1 + $) # , (12) D> > 2 (naïve) (2007)

(52)

2003 2007 21 COE 2008 COE 2012 2013 3 20 69 2012 2013 2012 1930 1380 2013

(53)

1380 818 71.5% 59.3% 1577 5 , 1 ( ) 0 10 90% 10 1 10 1 0 84

(54)

AQ-3 7 A B 1 9 A B ○ AQ-4 90 97 A B 1 9 A B ○

(55)

6 A B ( -10% 5100% ) A F A B 1 F<=>+ 2 F0>+ (Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2019) 7 90 97 F<=>+ = F0>+ F<=>+ < F0>+ 7 F<=>+ > F0>+ 8 F<=>+< F0>+ 1 0

Thaler(1981) (2009) Iketa et al(2010) (2016) Kureishi and Wakabayashi(2019)

A B Harrison et al. (2002)

Iketa et al(2010) Kureishi and Wakabayashi(2019) Loewenstein (1987) Sayman and Öncüler (2009)

(56)

2009 Kureishi and Wakabayashi(2019) 9

%=G82HI"=G? !$+ !&JKI;$9=@L<M2HHK + N?O + P?, (12)

(HyperbolicDummy) (12) ! ! > 0 Z 2 ( ) (25% 50% 75%) ( ) 7 (2009) ( )

(57)

( )

(2007)

^G$=@@H;G"M2HHK? K? 1| D&JKI;$9=@L<M2HHK, `@O

aLbLGA^-I;G8;8"=c;G8L=G?=D$+ D&JKI;$9=@L<M2HHK + `@d + e? ,

(13) (13) 2 EnrollmentDummy@ LivingExpensestoPension@ (HyperbolicDummy) D& 2 2

(58)

F / 1 (a) Zhang 2016 (b) 1-1 (a) 49%

(59)

3 1 7 F<=>+ 2112% 90 97 F0>+ 1832% 1-2 (b) 18% 13% Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) Zhang(2016)

(60)

2 20 30 40 3.1 50 60 2.9 20 30 60 40 50 3 1 30 40 30 40 50 60 50 60 3

(61)

70

27% 5000%

15%

14.27%

(Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2019)

4 Eisenhauer and

Ventura (2006) Zhang(2016)

1 (b)

(1)

(62)

5% (2) ( 7 ) ( 7 ) 0.17 ((0.071-0.086)/0.086) ) ( 7 ) 0.001 5 30 40 40 21~22% 50 60 50 60 Angeletos et al.(2001)

(63)

8.1 6 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) 1% 4.3 (2) 33

(64)

(a) (b) 2 (1) (2) 30 40 50 2 2

(65)
(66)

1

2012 2013

(67)

1 1-1 (a) 1,577 3.053 0.775 ( , %) 1,577 49.401 26.626 1,577 2.980 0.842 1,577 1.008 0.652 ( 7 , %) 1,577 2112.229 2324.665 (90 97 , %) 1,577 1832.136 2228.967 1-2 (b) (%) (p ) 20-29 316 17% 30-39 325 16% 8.004 40-49 324 13% (0.156) 50-59 303 14% 60-69 300 16% 70- 9 44% 803 13% 5.119 774 18% (0.024)** 325 18% 2.797 1,252 15% (0.094)* 1,046 16% 0.5777 531 15% (0.447) 1,030 16% 1.247 547 14% ( 0.264) 1,352 15% 0.0559

(68)

225 16% (0.813) 421 19% 392 14% 7.961 400 17% (0.047)** 364 12% 69 32% 0-9% 130 9% 10-19% 236 17% 20-29% 374 17% 24.119 30-39% 234 16% (0.007)*** 40-49% 146 13% 50-59% 122 13% 60-69% 81 14% 70-79% 65 15% 80-89% 63 8% 90% 57 12% 485 19% 693 13% 11.776 319 14% (0.019)** 70 24% 10 20% 2012 2013 * ** *** 10% 5% 1%

(69)

2 2012 2013

2

3.104

3.161

3.062

2.989

2.844

6 ( 4 , %)

48.937

48.172

51.253

51.257

47.408

2.968

3.025

3.062

2.957

2.880

3

0.443

0.942

1.031

1.155

1.489

5 (0 7 , %)

2927.522

2192.425

1966.590

1853.531

1600.502

5 (90 97 , %)

2521.244

1923.280

1742.096

1643.215

1311.217

316

325

324

303

309

(70)

3 -10% 0% 5% 15% 50% 100% 200% 500% 5000% 5001% -10% 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.00 0% 0.06 0.57 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5% 0.00 0.44 6.40 0.38 0.32 0.51 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.00 15% 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.32 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 50% 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 1.59 1.78 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.00 100% 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.13 8.69 2.54 0.57 0.13 0.00 200% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.82 5.52 2.22 0.32 0.00 500% 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.51 3.04 17.76 2.54 0.00 5000% 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.06 0.13 1.01 7.67 27.39 0.63 5001% 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.78 1 6 74.5 6 % )) 5. 0 0 0 2 3 ) ( ) ) 15.

(71)

4 0.086** 0.071* (2.14) (1.75) 0.001* (1.79) ) 0.112** 0.111** (2.52) (2.50) ) 0.180*** 0.178*** (3.91) (3.88) ) 0.313*** 0.315*** (5.78) (5.82) 0.014 0.015* (1.44) (1.51) 7 -0.019* -0.019* (-1.79) (-1.84) -0.050 -0.052* (-1.65) (-1.70) 0.033 0.035 (0.64) (0.67) -0.005 -0.005 (-0.11) (-0.11) 0.090** 0.088* (1.96) (1.92) 0.050 0.050 (0.89) (0.88) 0.140*** 0.140*** (6.89) (6.83) ) -0.044 -0.041 (-1.42) (-1.31) 0.001 0.001 (0.99) (0.95) -1616.6*** -1618.3*** (-29.50) (-29.44) 1577 1577 0.414 0.415 t * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% ) ( 2

(72)

5 (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) * L -0.015 -0.044 0.188** 0.153* 0.210** 0.223** -0.044 -0.056 0.058 0.04 (-0.21) (-0.61) (2.17) (1.75) (2.42) (2.66) (-0.44) (-0.57) (0.58) (0.43) 0.003* 0.003* -0.001 0.001 0.001 (1.73) (1.69) (-0.80) (0.64) (0.53) -1980.3*** -1984.1*** -1615.4*** -1634.6*** -1487.6*** -1485.7*** -1521.7*** -1521.2*** -1845.0*** -1834.1*** (-14.75) ( -14.87) (-13.63) (-13.52) (-11.99) (-11.93) (-12.16) (-12.14) (-13.46) (-13.41) 0.524 0.530 0.426 0.431 0.422 0.423 0.407 0.407 0.604 0.604 S:0 1 : % : ) : % 6t 2 5 : 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 O 1 1 7 342 316 325 324 303 309 , L L ( L ) L

(73)

6 -0.043** -0.040** -0.330* -0.295* (-2.43) (-2.23) (-1.95) (-1.70) -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.007*** 0.007*** (-2.89) (-2.86) (3.11) (3.15) -0.0002 -0.003 (-1.13) (-1.03) 0.005* 0.005* -0.012 -0.015 (1.75) (1.68) (-0.37) (-0.43) -0.004 -0.004 0.041 0.043 (-1.22) (-1.18) (1.11) (1.15) -0.007 -0.006 -0.137 -0.132 (-0.62) (-0.58) (-1.14) (-1.10) -0.006 -0.005 -0.390** -0.385** (-0.38) (-0.35) (-2.08) (-2.06) -0.016 -0.015 -0.377** -0.370** (-1.03) (-1.01) (-2.05) (-2.01) -0.015 -0.014 -0.028 -0.025 (-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.13) (-0.12) 7 -0.004 -0.004 -0.028 -0.029 (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.36) (-0.37) ) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.183 0.183 (2.67) (2.66) (1.34) (1.34) ) 0.012** 0.012** -0.077 -0.078 (2.31) (2.30) (-0.97) (-0.98) 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.389** 0.388** (2.74) (2.74) (2.49) (2.49) 0.029 0.029 0.564* 0.563* (1.09) (1.08) (1.86) (1.85) 0.018 0.020 0.112 0.126 (0.66) (0.70) (0.40) (0.45)

Yes Yes Yes Yes

-42.01 -23.95 1098.0*** 1098.7*** (-1.27) (-1.27) (4.29) (4.29) 0.075 0.074 0.146 0.146 1513 1513 1513 1513 ( ) t * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% ) ( 2

(74)

(a) (2) (4) (1) (2) 1% (3) (4) 1% (b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (c) (1) (2) (3) (4) (d) (1) (2)

(75)

(3) (4)

(e)

(76)

3

:

JEL Classification Codes:I23; J24; J45

1 2 ( 2019) 2000 2000 95 2008 500 2018 753 ( 2009, 2017, 2019) ( ) ( ) 2015, 2015 1978

(77)

(Deng 1983) (2007) 264 (2013) 2008 2011 87 Becker(1964) Spence(1973) ( 2007) Arteaga(2018)

(78)

(1994)

Felipe and Hernando(2019)

7.4 4.6

Tanaka,Narita,and Moriguchi(2020) Japanese Personnel Inquiry Records

(

2017) Kawaguchi and Ma(2008) 1969

(

(79)

(1994) Kawaguchi and Ma(2008)

Tanaka,Narita,and Moriguchi(2020) 1966 1976

10

(80)

(2007) 1949 2014 2 3 4 5 6 7

(81)

!

"

!

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#

t k t

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t

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%

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), (1)

t

!

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!

m

$(#

t

,!

"

)<$(#

t

,

!

&

), (2)

'(!

"

, #

t

)

P

t

!

" t

#

t

P

t

='(!

"

,#

t

) , (3)

P

t

−$(#

t

,!

"

) = '(!

"

,#

t

)−$(#

t

,!

"

) , (4)

'(!

"

,#

()*+

)−$(#

()*+

,!

"

) ≥'(!

"

,#

2,-

)−$(#

2,-

,!

"

) , (5)

i ii

P

t

(82)

!

m n r

!

m

!

n

!

r

#

P

t,m

≠P

k,m

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

m

, (6)

P

t,n

≠P

k,n

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

n

, (7)

P

t,r

≠P

k,r

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

r

, (8)

P

t,m

=P

k,m

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

m

, (9)

P

t,n

=P

k,n

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

n

, (10)

P

t,r

=P

k,r

#./ #

t

≠#

%,

!

r

, (11)

P

m

=P

n

=P

r

#./ !

m

≠!

n

≠!

r

, (12)

(Time_at_College) (STratio) (Promotion_rate) (Entrance_system)

(83)

567879:7;<=9> = @0+ @1BC6=9:7 + @2C:8>_=9_D7EE>F> + @3G;96=;H>_IJI9>8 + K

, (13)

@1 @2 c 1966 8 8 11 10 ( 1977) 1950

(84)

1966 6 4 1970 1 1966 4 1965 67.4 1970 4.8 1965 5.3 1972 0.82 1970 3 3 1970 1976

(85)

( 2008) 94 1976 10 1977 8 1977 10 1977 2 2,287 1977 1 1978 570 610 1977 27 4.8% 1978 40.2 7% 2 1977 1978 1977 27 1978 40.2 1978 1982 45.7 1981 14 30

(86)

3

(13)

4/.&.+".,56+)M= 8N+ 8O:;/6+".M+ 8P;"&)_6+_=.>>)?)M+ 8Q5)$.&&),-)-_6-&"**".,_*@*+)& +

8RA"B)-_6-&"**".,_*@*+)& + 8S5)*C&)-_D),)/6>_ 6-&"**".,_*@*+)& + 8TD/)6+FC&&@ + 8UG1982 +

LMM + 'M

, (14)

567879:7;_6=9>N BC6=9:7N t Time_at_CollegeO t 3 1 1965 4 6 1971 1971 1970 1956

(87)

1970 1970 1978 1971 1972 1978 1972 1978 1 0 (Recommended_admission_system) 1971 1976 3 1979 1976 1978 1971 1979 1 0 (Mixed_admission_system)( ) 1980 1980 1 0 (Resumed_General_ admission_system) 3 1970 1958 1960 1962 1964 1 0 (GreatDummy) 1976

(88)

4 1982 1982 1

0 F1982 (F1982Dummy)

(2007)

(2011) aN t (Male ratio)

(Average age) (Final education) (Study

abroad ratio) (Party standing) t (Number of

graduates) (Trend) 2 (Trend2)

(STratio) 8O< 0 (Time_at_College) 8P> 0 ( Recommended_admission_system) (Mixed_admission_system) ( ) 8Q,8R< 0 (Resumed_General_ admission_system)

(89)

(Baseline) 8S= 0 8T< 0 1982 8U> 0 ( ) (2007 )

(90)

2007 (2007 ) 821 3 4 2 1948 2007 58 41 77 9 4.3% 6.5 1970 1974 4 1966 1969 18 5 1948 1951

(91)

3 1948 1951 4 1966 1969 1970 1949 2014 1978 5 1968 1968 1971 1973 1978 4 1982 (Kawaguchi and Ma 2008) 1949 2014 1956 1993 1951 10 ( ) 6 1956 1951 6

(92)

1993 1956 1993 33 3 0.938 1 1 4.34 4.34 6 1959 1972 1972 U 7 2 5

(93)

(1) 1% 1 0.456 0.284 (2) (1956-1961 1965-1970 ) (2) (2) -0.452 (1) -0.456 (2) (3) -0.504 (1) (2) 1% 0.301 t 1.64 10% t 1.69 (1) (2)

(94)

(2) 5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1962-1964 ) (5) (1982 ) 1970 (1) -0.682 (2) -0.245 (3) -1.099 GreatDummy 0.236 F1982Dummy 1.226 (F1982Dummy) (3) -0.428

(95)

-0.12 0.236 (1982 ) 1% (2007) 1949 2014 ( ) (1) (2) (3)

(96)
(97)

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(98)

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(102)

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(103)

3 (2007 ) 1949 2014 ) 2 2 2 (Promotion ratio) 1 33 0.938 0.016 3.333 (STratio) 33 4.341 0.813 7.399 (Years_at_college) 33 3.596 2.000 5.200 (Male ratio) 33 0.930 0.625 1.000 (Average_age) 33 58.359 47.750 70.500 (Final education) 33 6.547 5.000 7.250

(Study abroad ratio) 33 0.050 0.000 0.500

(Number of graduates) 33 24.291 0.600 61.400

(Party standing) 32 33.593 25.000 46.667

((Trend) 33 31.364 15.000 48.000

(104)

4 (2007 ) 1949 2014 1959 2 1.000 70.500 1968.500 6.000 0.000 7.000 0.286 7.399 5.000 1960 2 1.000 68.500 1980.500 6.500 0.500 13.600 0.147 7.297 4.500 1961 3 1.000 65.667 1960.333 5.667 0.000 15.100 0.199 7.000 3.000 1962 9 0.889 69.000 1965.778 5.778 0.111 17.700 0.508 6.552 4.111 1963 12 1.000 66.917 1969.000 6.000 0.000 19.900 0.603 6.016 4.909 1964 20 0.850 66.050 1967.632 6.200 0.050 20.400 0.980 5.576 4.941 1965 12 0.917 66.583 1966.364 6.083 0.083 18.600 0.645 5.295 4.909 1966 25 0.880 64.200 1967.409 6.167 0.000 14.100 1.773 4.805 4.591 1967 23 1.000 63.957 1969.091 6.182 0.000 12.500 1.840 4.178 4.714 1968 35 0.971 62.257 1971.833 6.171 0.000 15.000 2.333 3.356 4.839 1969 21 0.900 60.947 1973.938 6.429 0.050 15.000 1.400 2.349 4.412 1970 21 0.857 61.190 1973.500 6.476 0.048 10.300 2.039 1.505 5.200 1972 2 1.000 57.500 . 6.500 0.000 0.600 3.333 0.813 2.000 1973 5 0.800 57.400 1973.600 7.000 0.200 1.700 2.941 1.192 3.750 1974 5 1.000 56.200 1974.000 6.600 0.000 3.000 1.667 1.840 2.200 1975 11 1.000 56.636 1974.700 6.636 0.273 4.300 2.558 2.511 2.800 1976 9 0.889 57.000 1976.750 6.333 0.000 11.900 0.756 2.967 3.111 1977 13 1.000 55.154 1973.750 6.692 0.077 19.400 0.670 3.228 3.333 1978 9 1.000 52.889 1978.286 6.778 0.111 16.500 0.545 3.562 3.000 1979 13 1.000 54.385 1976.727 7.077 0.000 8.500 1.529 3.852 2.750 1980 8 0.625 52.250 1976.250 7.000 0.000 14.700 0.544 4.161 2.600 1981 7 0.857 54.143 1976.000 7.000 0.000 14.000 0.500 4.573 2.800 1982 69 0.853 52.691 1978.449 6.897 0.060 45.700 1.510 4.502 3.850 1983 13 0.923 49.538 1980.545 6.615 0.000 33.500 0.388 4.401 3.833 1984 10 0.800 55.700 1974.222 6.800 0.100 28.700 0.348 4.360 2.900 1985 18 0.667 52.000 1976.882 7.056 0.000 31.600 0.570 4.371 3.375 1986 4 1.000 47.750 1982.000 7.250 0.000 39.300 0.102 4.637 3.750 1987 6 1.000 56.833 1973.000 7.167 0.000 53.200 0.113 4.900 4.000 1988 3 1.000 54.000 1969.000 7.000 0.000 55.300 0.054 5.092 3.000 1989 1 1.000 68.000 1966.000 5.000 0.000 57.600 0.017 5.176 2.000 1990 2 1.000 48.000 1980.000 7.000 0.000 61.400 0.033 5.204 2.500 1991 1 1.000 50.000 1980.000 7.000 0.000 61.100 0.016 5.238 3.000 1992 1 1.000 52.000 1975.000 7.000 0.000 60.400 0.017 5.330 3.000

(105)

5 (1) (2) (3) Stratio( ) -0.456*** -0.452*** -0.504*** (-6.25) (-4.70) (-2.97) Years_at_college 0.284** -0.089 0.301 (-2.73) (-0.59) (1.64) Recommended_admission_system -0.682 -0.428 (-1.13) (-0.59) Mixed_admission_system -0.245 0.487 (-0.60) (0.49) Resumed_General_ admission_system 3 -1.099*** -0.120 (-3.62) (-0.12) GreatDummy( 9 (4) 0.085 0.236 (0.51) (0.82) F1982Dummy( 9 )(5) 1.226*** 1.681*** (10.78) (3.85) Male ratio( 3 ) 0.784 (0.78) Average age( ) -0.059 (-1.71) Final education( ) -0.331 (-1.35)

study abroad ratio(t 3 ) 2.354*

(1.92) Number of graduates( ) -0.038 (-1.53) Party standing( 2 .0 0.074** (2.26) Trend( ) -0.313* (-1.83) Trend2( ) 0.004* (1.85) 1.899*** 3.760*** 10.36* (3.67) (3.54) (2.02) N 33 33 32 Root MSE 0.573 0.477 0.497 R-squared 0.640 0.792 0.857 ( 1 * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 3 ) 7 3 3 2 1

(106)

1. Stata dfuller ( dfuller Dickey-Fuller ( ( 9 ( dfuller ( dfuller promotion_ratio,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -2.166 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0192

. dfuller STratio,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -1.838 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0380

(107)

. dfuller Years_at_college,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -3.223 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0015

dfuller R1972_1978,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -1.737 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0463

. dfuller Mix,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -5.657 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

(108)

. dfuller o1980,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -0.769 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.2238

dfuller G1962_1964,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -2.600 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0072

. dfuller E1982,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -5.657 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

(109)

dfuller male_ratio,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -4.827 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

. dfuller aver_age,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -2.674 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0060

. dfuller party_standing,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 30 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -3.662 -2.467 -1.701 -1.313 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0005

(110)

. dfuller final_education,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -3.738 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.000

. dfuller study_abroad_ratio,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value

Z(t) -6.792 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

. dfuller trend,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -0.525 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.3016

(111)

dfuller trend2,drift

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 32 Z(t) has t-distribution

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -8.468 -2.457 -1.697 -1.310 p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 2. 1 ( e1 ( dfuller e1

Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 30 Interpolated Dickey-Fuller

Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical Statistic Value Value Value Z(t) -4.317 -3.716 -2.986 -2.624

(

(112)

7 (AC ) ( 7

e1 estat bgodfrey,estat wntestq,estat dwatson

(

( (

Number of gaps in sample: 1

Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation

lags(p) | chi2 df Prob > chi2 1 0.715 1 0.3977

H0: no serial correlation estat dwatson

Number of gaps in sample: 1

(113)

. wntestq e1

(note: time series has 1 gap) Portmanteau test for white noise

Portmanteau (Q) statistic = 12.3852 Prob > chi2(14) = 0.5754

(114)

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