An Argument Concerning abhāvapramāṇa in the
Ślokavārttika:
In Contrast to anumāna in vv. 38–44
M
ICHIMOTODaisei
1. Introduction
The problem of how to determine non-existence was long debated among Indian philo-sophical schools. Regarding this problem, Kumārila claims in his Ślokavārttika (ŚV)
abhāvapariccheda that abhāvapramāṇa is an independent pramāṇa which grasps
non-existence, rejecting the possibility that other pramāṇas, such as anumāna, can grasp it. In his rejection, he raises (1) existence and (2) non-existence as the possible probans. Of these two possibilities, (2) non-existence is explained as the non-occurrence of the five
pramāṇas other than abhāvapramāṇa.
Taber,1) Steinkellner,2) Kellner3) and others have dealt with the question of whether Kumārila s opponent in ŚV abhāvapariccheda vv. 38–44 is Dharmakīrti, in view of the chronology between the two thinkers. Here, I will examine the context of the pūrvapakṣa in vv. 38–44 by introducing new additional information from both ŚV and its commentaries.
2. Criticism of the logical mark as non-occurrence of pramāṇa
The opponent lists the non-occurrence of pramāṇa as the logical mark in vv. 38–44,4) defin-ing anumāna in v. 44 as follows:
[The opponent] accepts cognition which comes up by [the logical mark having] the three characteristics as inference. However, that which has a nature of non-occurrence does not expect a cause in any case (v. 44).5)
As seen, this inference is defined as cognition by means of the logical mark, which should have the three characteristics (trilakṣaṇa, trairūpya). In Sucarita Miśra s
cited in terms of the opponent s definition of inference,6) although none of the commenta-tors, including Umbeka, author of Ślokavārttikavyākhyā (ŚVV), mentions the contents of the three characteristics themselves. However, in the ŚVK and NR, the non-occurrence of
pramāṇa mentioned as the pūrvapakṣa in v. 38ab is thought to be the logical reason of
non-cognition (anupalabdhihetu) as asserted by Dharmakīrti.7) According to Sucarita Miśra and Pārthasārathi Miśra, such an interpretation is an anachronistic problem.8)
3. non-occurrence of pramāṇas
≠
the logical reason of non-cognition
The above problem, in which the opponent claims the non-occurrence of pramāṇa as the logical mark, is rejected by Kumārila in vv. 40–41.9) If it were the logical mark, this would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress: if one proves non-existence by means of the non-occurrence of pramāṇa, since the logical mark (X1) is non-existent, another non- occurrence of pramāṇa (X2) would be needed to prove the logical mark (X1). Hence this leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. While this fallacy in the non-occurrence of pramāṇa is pointed out in vv. 40–41, it cannot be criticism of the logical reason of non-cognition which mentioned ŚVK and NR ad. v. 38. This is because the anupalabdhi becoming the logical mark is also criticized by Dharmakīrti in the same way.10) He states that the fallacy of infinite regress would happen if we interpret anupalabdhi as non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha).11) According to his interpretation, it is not anupalabdhihetu as
paryudāsa that should be adopted as the pūrvapakṣa in vv. 40–41, but the non-occurrence
of pramāṇa as prasajyapratiṣedha. Arcata, in his Hetubinduṭīkā (HBṬ), identifies the oppo-nent being criticized in view of the fallacy of on infinite regress as Īśvarasena.12) However, Īśvarasena, as for anupalabdhi, claims the mere absence of cognition (upalabdhyabhāvamātra) in the form of Dignāga s developing a mere non-perception (adarśanamātra),13) admitting it as the third pramāṇa, not as a part of anumāna. Hence we cannot identify the opponent in vv. 40–41 as Īśvarasena based on the context of HBṬ.
Sucarita Miśra, despite understanding Dharmakīrti s anupalabdhihetu, considers the opponent in vv. 40–41 to be Dharmakīrti by citing another passage from the PVSV.14) How-ever, that context cannot be regarded as the fallacy of an infinite regress; the logical reason of non-cognition has various forms, even affirmative forms, like viruddhopalabdhi and
viruddhakāryopalabdhi. Even when such affirmative forms are employed to try to prove
the inferential form of the logical reason of non-cognition. In this understanding, whenever the negation, e.g. the linguistic action regarding non-existence, is proved, it is always estab-lished by the logical reason of non-cognition. However, Sucarita Miśra takes the proban-dum to be non-existence, not the linguistic action regarding non-existence.15) On the other hand, the ŚVV does not explain it as anupalabdhihetu, unlike the ŚVK and NR.16)
Since the ŚVK and NR interpret the pūrvapakṣa in vv. 40–41 as Dharmakīrti s
anupalabdhihetu, despite the fact that they follow his logic precisely, we need to examine
Dignāga s negative argument. The ŚVK and NR cite PS II 1b for the three characteristics of the logical reason, although Dignāga does not willingly make a negative argument. Meanwhile, there is a negative argument about primordial matter (pradhāna) in the
Nyāyamukha,17) where the opponent suggests the inferential form as follows: [Thesis]: Primordial matter does not exist.
[Reason]: Because it is not cognized.
Although primordial matter is not a real entity, but rather an imagined object, Dignāga admits the above negative inference of primordial matter as suggested by the opponent. However, this negative inference is dropped in PSV III, where Dignāga presents a parallel discussion about primordial matter.18)
To conclude, I will examine why the ŚVK interprets the opponent in vv. 38–44 by introducing Dharmakīrti s anupalabdhihetu. Sucarita Miśra does not comment on the ŚV, while misunderstanding Dharmkīrti s anupalabdhihetu. Nevertheless, since he realizes that Dharmakīrti s anupalabdhihetu is used in the sense of an implicative negation, with the probandum a linguistic action regarding non-existence or its fitness, not existence itself,19) he tries to conceive the opponent in vv. 38–44 as being Dharmakīrti. I assume that this is so for the following reason: despite the fact that Kumārila states the three characteristics of the logical mark in v. 44, in the NMu Dignāga does not elaborate on the argument of nega-tion except with regard to primordial matter and drops it altogether in PSV III. Īśvarasena claims that non-existence is established by non-cognition, which means the mere absence of cognition, however this is the third pramāṇa, not a part of anumāna. Also, in the period of Sucarita Miśra, the logical reason of non-cognition was generally established as a Buddhist opinion. This is why Sucarita Miśra may have interpreted it in the form found in the ŚVK.20)
4. Conclusion
Regarding the opposing opinion in vv. 38–44, the ŚVK and NR cite PS II 1b for the three characteristics of the logical mark in v. 44, although they develop the discussion in the form of interpreting it as the logical reason of non-cognition. Moreover, the ŚVK, in vv. 40–41, assumes this as the opinion of Dharmakīrti by contorting the context of the PVSV.
While the ŚVK grasps Dharmakīrti s logical reason of non-cognition precisely, its author adopts it however as the opposing opinion in vv. 38–44. This may be because 1) Īśvarasena, who admits anupalabdhi as non-implicative negation, asserted it as the third
pramāṇa; 2) Dignāga did not willingly mention the negative formula in the NMu and
dropped it in PS III; and 3) the logical reason of non-cognition of Dharmakīrti was gener-ally admitted as a Buddhist opinion.
Notes
1) Cf. Taber 1992; 2001. 2) Cf. Steinkellner 1979; 2013. 3) Cf. Kellner 1997. 4) ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 38ab: pratyakṣāder anutpattir nanu* liṅgaṃ bhaviṣyati / {* em. nanu: na ca ŚVV, na tu ŚVK, NR. ŚVV 419,11f: pratyakṣādyanutpatter bhaviśyatīti codayati –– pratyakṣāder anutpattir ity ardhena. Cf. ŚVK 207,3f; NR 486,15; ŚVV 421,16f. 5) ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 44: trilakṣaṇena yā buddhir janyate sānumeṣyate / na cānutpattirūpasya kāraṇāpekṣitā kvacit //44// 6) ŚVK 209,11f. ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 44: evaṃ hi te paṭhanti, trirūpāl liṅgato rthadṛg anumānam iti. NR 488,17f. ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 44, PS II 1ab: anumānaṃ dvidhā, svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato rthadṛk / PVin II 46,2f.: svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato rthadṛk /(1a,b) trilakṣaṇāl liṅgād yad anumeye rthe jñānam, tat svārtham anumānam. 7) ŚVK 207,3–13 ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 38ab, NR 486,15–487,10 ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda v. 38. 8) Cf. Frauwallner 1962; Kellner 1997, 128f.; Steinkellner 2013, 57f, fn. 64. 9) ŚV abhāvapariccheda vv. 40–41: na cānavagataṃ liṅgaṃ gṛhyate ced asāv api / abhāvatvād abhāvena gṛhyetānyena hetunā //40// sa cānyena grahītavyo nāgṛhīte hi liṅgatā / tadgṛhītir hi liṅgena syād anyenety anantatā //41// 10) As Taber (2001, 83) and Steinkellner (2013, II-58f., fn. 64) mention, the probandum of the logical reason of cognition is a linguistic action regarding non-existence, not non-existence itself, and the probandum to which the fallacy of an infinite regress is ad-opted is non-existence. Hence the opposing position doesn t match the logical reason of non-cognition. 11) PVSV 4,15–17, PVin II 58,3f. 12) HBṬ 167,8–11, HBṬ 176,3–14. Cf. Steinkellner 1967, 163– 165; 1979, 47f., fn. 123. 13) Cf. Katsura 1992. 14) ŚVK 208,14–16 ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda k.40–41: api ca –– nānavagatarūpaṃ liṅgam anumāne liṅgaṃ bhavati, tad iyaṃ pratyakṣādyanutpattir abhāvatvād apareṇa liṅgenāvagantavyā. evaṃ hi vadanti, yāvān kaścit pratiṣedhaḥ sa sarvo nupalabdher eva iti. PVSV 5,6–10 (PVin II 59,13–60,3):sā ca prayogabhedāt,
viruddhakāryayoḥ siddhir asiddhir hetubhāvayoḥ / dṛśyātmanor abhāvārthānupalabdhiś caturvidhā //4// yāvān kaścit pratiṣedhaḥ sa sarvo nupalabdheḥ. tathā hi sa dvidhā kriyeta kasyacid vidhinā
niṣedhena vā. PVSVṬ 35,7–9: yāvān kaścid iti vyāptyā caitat kathyate. na sa kaścit pratiṣedhavyavahāro liṅgajo sti. yo nupalabdhim antareṇa śakyate kartum. na tu pratyakṣasādhyatvam abhāvavyavahārasya
nirākṛtam. 15) Karṇakagomin reads pratiṣedha in PVSV which Sucarita Miśra cites as pratiṣedhavyavahāra. On the other hand, Sucarita Miśra should interpret it as abhāva. See. fn. 14. 16) Cf. Steinkellner 1979, 48, fn. 123; 2013, 57f., fn. 64. 17) NMu T 32,1b27–c4: 夫立宗法理，応
更以余法為因成立此法．若即成立有法為有，或立為無，如有成立最勝為有，現見別物有総類故，或立為
無，不可得故，其義如何．此中但立別物定有一因為宗，不立最勝，故無此失．若立為無，亦仮安立不可得
法，是故亦無有有法過．Cf. PVSV 105,15–107,14; Katsura 1992, 230f. 18) PSV (Kanakavarman) P 128b6–8; PSV(Vasudhararakṣita) D 43b6f., P 46b5–7. Cf. Katsura 1992, 230f. 19) ŚVK 207,5–8 ad. ŚV abhāvapariccheda k. 38. 20) The possibility that Sucarita Miśra knows criticism against Dharmakīrti in Bṛhaṭṭīkā and hence compare and adjust the interpretation of ŚV can not be ignored.
Abbreviations and Bibliography
HBṬ: Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa: With the Sub-commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra. Eds.
Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Jinavijaya. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949. NR: The Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vārtika of Kumārila Bhatta: With the Commentary Called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra. Ed. Rāmaśāstri Tailanga. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series no. 3. Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Se-ries Office, 1898–1899. PVSV: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary: Text and Critical Notes. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960. PVSVṬ: Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā tattīkayā ca sahitam. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad: Kitāba Mahala, 1943. PVin II: Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2. Ed. Ernst Stenkellner. Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autono-mous Region no. 2. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House, 2007. ŚV: See ŚVV, ŚVK and
NR. ŚVK: MīmāṃsāŚlokavārttikaṃ: Sucaritamiśrapraṇitayā Kāśikākhyayā Ṭīkayā Sametam, part 3. Ed. V. A. Ramasvami Shastri. Trivandrum: University of Travancore, 1943. ŚVV:
Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa. Ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras: University of Madras, 1971. Frauwallner, Erich. 1962. Kumārila s Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 6: 78–90. Kellner, Birgit. 1997. Nichts bleibt nichts: Die buddhistische Zurückweisung von Kumārilas abhāvapramāṇa. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 39. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien. Katsura
Shōryū 桂紹隆．1992. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on adarśanamātra and anupalabdhi. Asiatische Studien
46(1): 222–231. Steinkellner, Ernst. 1967. Dharmakīrti s Hetubinduḥ. Teil 2. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien: Kommissionsverlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
̶̶̶. 1979. Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ: Zweites Kapitel: svārthānumānam. Teil 2. Übersetzung
und Anmerkungen. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. ̶̶̶.
2013. Dharmakīrtis frühe Logik: Annotierte Übersetzung der logischen Teile von Pramāṇavārttika 1 mit
der Vṛtti. 2 parts. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies. Taber, John. 1992. Further Observations on Kumārila s
Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Journal of Oriental Research 55–62: 179–189. ̶̶̶. 2001. Much Ado about
Noth-ing: Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita, and Dharmakīrti on the Cognition of Non-Being. Journal of the American Oriental Society 121(1): 72–88.
Key words abhāvapramāṇa, non-occurrence of pramāṇa, anupalabdhihetu
